

**Resilience for Peace (R4P)**  
Understanding the Border Area in  
Northern Côte d'Ivoire Research Series

# **POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS (PEA)**

## **LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AEJ</b>	Youth Employment Agency
<b>CAPEC</b>	CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit
<b>CCM</b>	Civil-Military Cell
<b>CDLM</b>	Local Mining Development Committee
<b>CEPE</b>	Certificate of Elementary Primary Studies
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus Disease 2019
<b>EAI</b>	Equal Access International
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Community of West African States
<b>ENV</b>	Standard of Living Survey
<b>FCFA</b>	Franc of the African Financial Community
<b>INS</b>	National Institute of Statistics
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>NGO</b>	Nongovernmental Organization
<b>PEA</b>	Political Economy Analysis
<b>R4P</b>	Resilience for Peace
<b>SDF</b>	Security And Defense Forces
<b>THIMO</b>	Labor-Intensive Work
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development



## 1. Executive Summary

### Context

As part of the Resilience for Peace (R4P) project, the CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (CAPEC) was selected by Equal Access International (EAI) to carry out two studies in the northern border areas: (1) a political economy analysis (PEA) of local governance and (2) an analysis of the political economy of the security context in the north and its management by national security institutions.

The general objective of this PEA is to understand and map the power dynamics of civil governance in the northern border regions. More precisely, it maps the institutions and networks of local and decentralized state actors as well as their interactions; it describes the dynamics and interests that promote or hinder governance systems as they seek to be in accordance with established legal frameworks; it investigates the interactions of community and customary authorities with state systems; and it identifies formal and informal decision makers and “spoilers” of effective local governance in its various dimensions, such as financial management, basic service delivery, political accountability, and communications.

### Study Methods and Constraints

The study draws on document reviews, qualitative data collection (160 interviews and 37 focus group discussions with 407 individuals), and direct observation. Data collection used exploratory analysis from targeted individual and group interviews. It was supplemented by triangulation of the data collected to ensure the quality and consistency of the information obtained from these different sources (i.e., interviews and administrative data).

The research results should be interpreted in light of the following limitations: the unavailability of up-to-date administrative data on the state of governance per region and per sector, and the fact that some local governance actors could not be met because they were absent from their post.

### Key Results

#### Basic Factors of Local Governance

**The framework of national institutions is subject to the State’s “mastery” of local governance (administrative processes, basic service delivery), which is determined by constantly shifting political interests.** The decisions and actions of the local government are an extension of the vision of administrative management established by central authorities and aim to generate public validation from citizens through observable political impact. Yet, the reality of service delivery and local administration in the northern regions differs significantly from how these are envisioned by national frameworks, and from the efficacy of the State in the southern and central regions.

**Chronically under-resourced local authorities suffer from a lack of legitimacy given their inability to deliver basic services.** Local authorities, being entirely dependent on government subsidies whose annual amounts are centrally fixed, have little capacity to mobilize internal resources. Because this constrains their capacity to meet public demand for services, the legitimacy of their authority in the public eye is weak.

**Limited natural-resource management mechanisms.** Land, water resources, and rangelands are subject to pressure from all stakeholders, many with conflicting interests. As a result, natural resources are current and future sources of conflict. This competition



will likely erode further social cohesion, and possibly trigger violence, as communities question the transparency and credibility of existing mechanisms to manage these resources.

**Social and cultural norms that influence resource allocation and conflict management between and among communities.** Diverse intracommunity social and cultural norms influence both land allocation and interethnic alliances (Koulango–Lobi–Senoufo), which in turn serve as networks to prevent and manage conflict.

The legacies of the decade of instability (2002–2011) include social needs that cannot be addressed effectively in the short and medium term. This creates challenges for State and local authorities in meeting the basic service needs of populations, therefore increasing their delegitimization among citizens who feel abandoned.

### Rules of the Game in Local Governance

**Official rules and regulations are weakly enforced.** Local governance is based on several texts defining the political, administrative, and financial structure of relations between the State and local authorities, and on the functioning of local authorities, neither of which is consistently applied. Local administrations are currently marked by a chronic absence of municipal and regional council members, and of quality public service delivery.

Informal practices and arrangements, based on social norms, serve as palliatives for the shortcomings of standard (official) consultation frameworks. Several public consultation frameworks (formal and informal) exist at the local level. A crisis of confidence in the official channels favors the proliferation of

community consultation and informal communication networks.

**Games of political influence.** Strategies of political influence involve elected officials and administrative executives of the northern regions and their populations, mainly community leaders and young people. The actions of elected officials and senior administrators are oriented toward political posturing and greater visibility, which leads to them pursue strategies to manipulate and influence public opinion and perception.

### Current Situation

**Despite some positive initiatives, including renewed investment by central and local authorities, serious shortcomings remain.** These shortcomings include poor access to basic services and economic opportunities, multiple threats to social cohesion, weak inclusion of and participation from youth and women traders, influences from neighboring countries, and diverse and contradictory communications and consultation channels.

### Local Governance Dynamics

**Dynamics that favor improved local governance** include the continuation of renewed investment by the State in priority social sectors, specifically in the northern border areas; approaching municipal and regional elections in 2023; the reliability of intra- and intercommunity social norms; some compliance with local solutions to resource-related conflict; and the effectiveness of certain community-driven resilience mechanisms.

**Dynamics that obstruct local governance** include processes around national budget allocations to local authorities; communities' own weak resource-mobilization capacities; upcoming municipal and regional elections; the





chronic absenteeism of municipal and regional council members; communities turning inward along ethnic and political lines; opacity and unaccountability in natural-resource management and the dearth of livelihood alternatives; confusion between local authorities and the newly created autonomous districts; mistrust between citizens, especially youth (miners, motorcycle taxis, cross-border traders) and the security and defense forces (SDF), and a general deterioration in security (including but not exclusive to the terrorist threat).

## Implications

### The main outcomes of this PEA for local governance are the following:

- There is inadequate devolution of power, or decentralization, that hinders the local government from providing quality public services and addressing citizen needs.
- The current approach to local governance, driven by central authorities and marked by dense bureaucracy and punitive law enforcement, leaves communities feeling harassed and excluded from revenues generated by natural resources (minerals).
- There is a potential for social norms to improve state legitimacy, as long as community voices and needs are heard and incorporated into local governance processes.
- Limited community resources combined with non-inclusive local development planning efforts all converge to erode government legitimacy and responsive capacity.

To rebuild public legitimacy, the State must rethink its general approach to local governance across the northern border areas through diversification of economic opportunities for the most vulnerable, increased availability of economic and

communication infrastructure, and greater support to formal and informal bodies that foster social cohesion.

**Critical intervention areas.** Priority intervention areas include those without basic infrastructure and services; where public perception of state capacity to meet basic needs is negative or hostile; where community participation in local governance is weak; and where social cohesion and group dynamics between government, traditional authorities, and donors are compromised or convoluted. Priority areas include Kapégué and Flabougou (Bagoué), Téhini (Bounkani), and the Folon region.

**R4P support to local governance emphasis.** R4P support to local governance should include strengthening consultation frameworks between local governance actors and communities; capacity building on regulatory mechanisms for natural-resource management and conflict resolution; development of natural-resource monitoring systems (to identify sources of potential conflict and report illegal practices); advocacy for the active inclusion and participation of vulnerable groups (youth, women, and stigmatized communities) in local consultation frameworks; and studying ways to improve revenue potential for the most vulnerable to combat income disparity and improve social cohesion.

**Several actors can play a positive role in local governance.** Community leaders, elected officials and political actors, political and administrative authorities, and public service managers can play a positive role in local governance. Other actors also serve as “spoilers” of local governance processes: certain elected officials and political actors, SDF, restless segments of the youth demographic (e.g., motorcycle taxis,





smugglers, and gold washers), and traditional hunters, or dozors.

## 2. Introduction

### 2.1. Context and Study Rationale

The decade of military-political conflict, violence, and human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011) posed a real threat to the peace and stability of the country because it disrupted the social fabric and undermined development gains, escalated insecurity in the north, and considerably reduced trust between citizens and the state.

Various initiatives have been launched by the Ivorian Government and the international community (e.g., United Nations, African Union, Community of West African States [ECOWAS]) to consolidate peace and stability in the country, a sine qua non for economic growth and social cohesion. The gross domestic product grew by an average of 8% per year over the 2012-2015 period, and the poverty rate fell from 49.8% in 2011 to 46.3% in 2015 (INS, 2015). In addition, the national security situation has improved, with a security index that went from 3.8 in 2011 to 1.11 in 2016.

Despite these advances, Côte d'Ivoire continues to face major challenges. The economic upturn is unevenly distributed across the national territory, with significant disparities between the northern border regions and all other regions. Although the national poverty rate is 46.3%, the poorest regions are Folon (70.1%), Bafing (69.2%), Bagoué (68.5%), and Tchologo (65.6%), reflecting a deficit in access to basic infrastructure and services. However, these regions have significant natural resources and economic potential.

We note, for example, the Sissingué gold mine in Bagoué, near the Malian border, and the

Doropo Gold Mine near the Burkina Faso border in Bounkani. These resources, if well run and managed, and by incorporating local governance frameworks, could help reverse the chronic deficit in basic infrastructure and improve security governance. These changes would improve social cohesion and in turn mitigate the terrorist threat. Indeed, since the first terrorist attack in the seaside resort of Grand Bassam in March 2016, the terrorist threat is omnipresent in Côte d'Ivoire, but particularly in the border regions of Bounkani, Folon, Tchologo, and Bagoué. More recently in June 2020, and then in March, April, and June 2021, the localities of Kafolo, Téhini, and Tougbo were the site of attacks, confirming the vulnerability of these northern regions to violent extremism.

The regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, two countries deeply affected by terrorism, could bring about conditions favorable to a rapid transfer of violent extremist ideology among susceptible cross-border populations. If factors known to inhibit violent extremism and to promote resilience were prioritized and reinforced—such as better-controlled borders, cross-border interethnic and kinship alliances, and religious tolerance—State commitments to strengthen democracy, security, and prosperity would directly reinforce society's natural resistance to extremist ideology.

Conducting a PEA of local governance is one important step toward identifying the factors likely to help contain the rise of violent extremism.

### 2.2. Study Objectives and Research Questions

Following the terms of reference, the general aim of the research was to understand and map the power dynamics of local governance.



More precisely, this was to map the institutions and networks of local and decentralized state actors as well as their interactions; to describe the informal systems that promote or hinder the governance system to follow the established legal frameworks; to understand the interactions of community and customary governance with the state system and the enabling and inhibiting effects; and to identify formal and informal decision makers and “spoilers” of effective local governance in its various dimensions, such as financial resources, political influence, and communication.

More specifically, our focus involved the following:

- A brief literature review on local governance in the targeted regions.
- A stocktaking of the main government and donor programs in different areas (all sectors), with a focus on areas such as local governance, decentralization, improvement of basic services, community development, and the consolidation of peace.
- Analyzing the governmental system, in particular the organization chart of governmental structures and their contact with the so-called traditional or customary authorities.
- Understanding the management of power at the local level and the links with border officials in Mali and Burkina Faso.
- Researching each R4P intervention area and identifying its singularities.

This PEA of local governance in the northern border areas sought answers to the following questions:

- What are the local power dynamics around governance? Who controls the different decision-making processes? How are resources for basic services managed?

What are the gaps in basic service provision, including the protection of property and people?

- What are the interests of the various leaders at different levels? What hinders or helps them reach their goals? How do they listen to or ignore citizen needs?
- What are the relationships between youth, women, and state actors in the northern border areas? In particular, what are the mechanisms for consultation and participation of youth and women in local governance? What is the role of women in these areas?
- What are the programmatic entry points and positive openings for the R4P project in terms of local governance? What are, by area, the chances of success of the Project's advocacy campaigns that aim to address the gaps noted? To what extent can border areas be classified to include “ungoverned” spaces?
- Are there “champions” with whom the project team can work to advance governance and community resilience in the face of violent extremism? In this context, who are the main actors from civil society in the areas of intervention of the project, their credibility, their mission, and their ability to produce concrete results?

### 2.3. Study Methodology

The study drew upon exploratory, analytical, and participatory methods in a holistic research approach. It was based on qualitative methods with a wide variety of tools and techniques for collecting and analyzing data. The main stages in the implementation of the study were the following:

- Mission launch meeting on December 6, 2021, between EAI and CAPEC.



- A meeting to present the study methodology to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on December 7, 2021, with the participation of USAID, EAI, and the CAPEC research team.
- Training of the research team on the PEA methodology on December 7 and 8, 2021.
- Initial documentary review which helped finalize the data collection tools, in particular, the interview guide.
- Training of agents by CAPEC on December 13, 2021.

Data collection took place in two phases in the area targeted by the study: in the regions of Folon and Bagoué (December 14-23, 2021) and in the regions of Savanes, Tchologo, and Bounkani (January 5-15, 2022). It made it possible to carry out interviews with local governance actors in each region and each locality visited; collect, as available, administrative data; and make direct observations in the field.

In total, 160 interviews and 37 group discussions were conducted with 407 individuals, 21.30% of whom were women representing the diversity of local governance actors, in particular:

- Administrative authorities: prefects and subprefects
- Local authorities: regional councils, town halls
- Community leaders: local chiefdoms, community leaders, religious guides, leaders of women's/youth associations, neighborhood president
- The formal and informal private sector, in particular, certain companies and other economic interest groups (e.g., trade, agriculture, gold panning, transport, village committee for the management of natural resources)

- Members of local communities, such as natives and non-natives
- Officials and/or agents of the decentralized administration in specific sectors such as education, health, mines and energy, and agriculture
- Technical or sectoral coordination structures at the local level, such as the Local Mining Development Committees (CDLMs), the Education and Health Management Committees, and the Youth Employment Agency (AEJ)
- Security institutions, including the Inter-Army Technical Group, the National Gendarmerie, the National Police, and the Water and Forest Guards
- Relevant formal and informal actors: grain, development radio agents
- EAI operational teams in the areas visited

**Data analysis and preparation of reports through exploratory analysis of individual interviews and focus group discussions.** This was supplemented by the triangulation of collected data to ensure the quality and consistency of the information obtained from different sources (interviews and administrative data).

This approach made it possible to describe, examine, and explain the dynamics of the relationships between the various actors and interests, enabling the researchers to decide on fundamental factors, implicit rules of the game, and current dynamics of local governance.

The analysis also sought to comment on specific governance dynamics in each region, based on a certain number of criteria (see below), to propose actions likely to be implemented by the R4P project, and key actors to target to facilitate these processes.



This data collection process thus made it possible to generate summary reports on observations made during field research. These regular updates culminated in the present report, which, following a brief review of the literature on local governance, describes the study area and analyzes local governance and its implications for the R4P project.

Research results should be interpreted in light of the following limitations: the unavailability of up-to-date administrative data on the state of governance, and the absence of certain key local governance actors during the research period.

### Images from the Data Collection Phase



Interview with the secretary general of the Prefecture of Ferké



Interview with the Civil-Military Cell (CCM) of Ferké



Visit to Sikolo College







Visit of an artisanal mining site in Kong

### 3. Brief Review of the Literature on Local Governance

The notion of governance encompasses the capacities of coordination of public actors and institutions within a territorial structure. It synergizes private actors and their industrial organization on the one hand, and public actors and institutional organizations on the other (Guesnier 2006). Governance can be defined as the methods of government controlling agglomerations and, by extension, territorial public action (Leloup et al. 2005).

The concept of governance was mobilized by the theory of transaction costs, which rejects the idea that the market price is the only agent for regulating exchanges (Coase 1937). In governance, as opposed to markets, the reasoning is that transaction costs determine the nature of coordination between individuals and groups (Leloup et al. 2005). From this angle, governance can be defined as “a mode of local government centered on local actors and thus revealing a broader recourse to markets, political delegation, partnerships, etc.” (Leloup et al. 2005).

Local governance involves moving from central public affairs to local affairs. This transition presupposes that the state, which in earlier times was the sole actor, now relinquishes some of its powers and transfers them to decentralized local authorities. According to Blundo (2002), this stems from the reorganization of the techniques used to govern, by transferring regulatory powers to non-State, individual, or collective actors, to whom qualities of responsibility and rationality are conferred.

Local governance therefore covers the relationships between State actors in their local presence and other actors in society (Jessop 1997; Le Galès 2011). It particularly emphasizes the methods of coordination between these various actors that leads them to contribute to common projects (Rey-Vallette et al. 2010). Depending on the balance of power, local governance can manifest in various ways that, according to Bozzini and Enjolras (2011), can be centered on the State on society or, according to Arnouts et al. (2011), can cross the spectrum of hierarchical governance and self-governance being the two extremes.

Local governance can be influenced by five internal factors: control and accountability, strategic planning, operational planning, governance mechanisms, and the accomplishment of the mission (Turbide and Zúñiga-Salas, 2014). Good local governance presupposes that the members of the prefectural or municipal council ensure that certain elements of control are put in place and that they are held accountable for these elements.

These different elements can be linked to the different components of financial management or human resources. Accountability (Busson-Villa 1999; Carassus et al. 2013; Tankpé 2015)



and strategic planning are central concerns in decentralized communities.

Although many of these practices are favored in governance literature as “best practices,” each municipal or regional council must adapt to its context. To follow “good practices” precisely is no guarantee of sound governance. These practices are political in nature and heterogeneous in the Ivorian context; therefore, they are difficult to identify. Hence, we see the value-add and relevance of this study, the aim of which is to identify practices capable of improving local governance in the northern regions of Côte d'Ivoire.

## 4. Presentation of the Study Area

**Figure 1: Map of Côte d'Ivoire**



The intervention area of the R4P project (and the PEA study) includes all of the regions along the northern border with Mali and Burkina Faso. The targeted regions are:

- The regions of Folon, Bagoué, and Poro, bordering Mali
- The Tchologo region, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso

- The Boukani region, bordering Burkina Faso

The population of these northern border regions was approximately 2,000,000 inhabitants in 2014, per estimates by the National Institute of Statistics (INS). It is a predominantly young population, with approximately 50% women.

In this vast area (more than 80,000 km<sup>2</sup>) live mainly the Malinke Indigenous populations, the Senoufos, the Koulangos, and the Lobis. To this are added the foreign communities mainly from Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The population is predominantly Muslim and animist.

In this area, the climate is characteristic of the Sahelo-Sudanese type. The vegetation is wooded grassy savannah with forest galleries along the waterways (the classified forest of Mont Mandant, in Folon, or the Comoé National Park, in Boukani, extends over 11,000 km<sup>2</sup>).

This climate and vegetation are favorable to agropastoral economic development and subsistence livelihoods that occupy most of the population. Trade in the area comprises cash crops (e.g., cashew), staple crops (e.g., sorghum, maize), market gardening products, and livestock. It has small industrial units based on agricultural products, including cashew, cotton, shea, and honey. The economic environment has been marked in recent years by the appearance of formal and informal mining activities in most regions of the north.

The area also has a diversified cultural and tourist heritage, including several authentic traditional rites (e.g., the “poro” ceremony, N’Goron dance, yam festival) but also several natural sites (e.g., Comoé Park, Kong Mosque).

Despite these agroecological assets, the northern border region has fairly high poverty



rates (66.79%, according to the Standard of Living Survey, 2015), as shown below.

**Table 1: Poverty rate by region**

Region	Poverty Rate
Bagoué	77.22%
Bounkani	57.81%
Folon	71.29%
Poros	69.37%
Tchologo	52.37%

## 5. Results of the Local Governance PEA

### 5.1. Fundamental Factors

In the context of the study, we understand fundamental factors to be the main structural elements and actors that affect the character and legitimacy of the state, the political system, and economic choices.

*5.1.1. The framework of national institutions is subject to the State's "mastery" of local governance (administrative processes, basic service delivery), which is determined by constantly shifting political interests.*

The government organizes the management of the State through the institutional acts it adopts and applies (e.g., decrees, orders). The political and administrative decisions of the State primarily reflect its interests, such as changes in administrative subdivisions, creation of agencies at the decentralized level, appointments of political and administrative authorities, and allocation of resources. The result on the ground is a lack of singular focus and absence of continuity not only of strategy, but of the institutions responsible for the implementation of that strategy.

As evidence of this trend, we note the recent creation of autonomous districts as official structures that operate above the level of local authorities. Another example is the hierarchy of central resource allocation (subsidies), a small part of which is transferred to local authorities, while another is managed directly by the State through its sectoral ministries. According to a study by the Assembly of Regions and Districts of Côte d'Ivoire (2016), over the period of 2011 to 2015, 83% of the resources dedicated to local authorities (town halls and regional councils) were executed directly by the sectoral ministries.

The decisions and actions of central government are therefore part of a vision of administrative management but also aim for recognition and political dividends for local populations, creating tensions and competition with the interests and actions of the local government itself.

*5.1.2. Chronic resource shortfalls limit the performance of local authorities in basic service delivery, eroding public trust.*

At the local level, the main players driving development are the regional councils and the town halls, each with its areas of competence and specific attributions. Indeed, the Law n° 2001-476 of August 9, 2001, determines the general organization of territorial administration and specifies these structures as the primary instruments of local development for the benefit of the populations.

During the decade of crisis, local authorities were unable to act effectively on behalf of populations, but since then, post-crisis local elections have been trying to "catch up." As testified by an interviewee in Tchologo: "The regional council has been doing a lot lately, for example, funding the local college, the youth






center, and construction for the hospital. It's not enough, but compared to before, it's something." This is justified by an increase in the 3-year investment budgets of local authorities in the amount of subsidies granted by the State to local authorities.

As shown in Figure 2, there is an upward trend between 2018 and 2020, with a significant increase between 2018 and 2019 (31%) and a

less-marked increase between 2019 and 2020 (8% on average). Also, over the same period, the share of investment in the overall budget went from 62% to around 69% compared to the operating budget. This reflects the government's commitment to provide local communities with the necessary means to address development issues that fall within their prerogatives.

**Figure 2: Evolution of the investment budget of the study areas, 2018-2020**



Source: Author, based on data from the General Directorate of the Treasury.

However, it should be noted that this subsidy is rarely transferred in full to local authorities by the State. This therefore creates an imbalance in the intervention potential of local authorities for the implementation of their various development plans and programs.

To this must be added the fact that local authorities have, for the most part, low domestic financing capacities. By way of illustration, the mobilization of domestic resources of a town hall visited by the research team represented only 13% of the budget. The town hall of Téhini in Bounkani collects between 10,000 CFA Franc and 33,000 CFA Franc weekly as revenue from local commercial activities.

Ultimately, heavily affected by the decade of sociopolitical crisis, local authorities tend to recover gradually, but because of their limited resources in the face of increased needs, there is a marked delegitimization of these authorities in the eyes of populations regarding their ability to provide basic services.

### 5.1.3. Few mechanisms to manage natural resources

Land, water resources, and pasture are subject to pressure from almost all actors, many with divergent interests, such as political and administrative authorities, landowners, farmers, herders, gold mining companies, and illegal miners. These competing interests constitute the main players in stakeholder



relations at the local level. As such, they are reflections of their immediate political and socioeconomic context.

Clandestine gold panning is a good example of this phenomenon. Gold panning is attractive to many youth given the limited economic opportunities and employment in the northern border areas. According to government officials and community leaders, young people's lack of enthusiasm for established trades and traditional livelihoods is largely a result of the potential for higher revenues from panning.

Concerning land conflicts, these are complex and underpinned by divergent interests of distinct networks of power and influence. On the one hand, native landowners perceive the land as a source of income in terms of farms or dividends from transactions with a third party, and as markers of Indigenous identity. On the other hand, non-natives (particularly the Fulani) see land as intrinsic to their very livelihood, their traditions, and source of existence—the resource from which they build their lives and that of their animals. Indeed, the vegetation in northern localities is better adapted to the development of pastoralism and is resilient to climatic shocks (drought) in the Sahelian regions, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. During the annual dry season, competition for grazing land increases between both different herder groups (transhumant and local/sedentary) and between farmers and herders.

The scarcity of grazing areas is the basis of many conflicts between farmers and herders, particularly around water points. The need to create transhumance corridors and grazing areas suitable for livestock will help reduce these recurrent conflicts.

Natural resources are sources of conflict today and will be so in the future, given the

increasing pressures on social cohesion. The risks become higher as the transparency and credibility of the mechanisms for managing these resources are doubted by affected communities, given the conflicts of interest between actors responsible for managing the resources and any disputes that arise. It is commonly observed that the same community leaders who are charged with finding an amicable settlement when disputes arise are themselves livestock owners and benefit directly from livestock donations by the parties in conflict, thus limiting their neutrality.

The frustrations and sense of injustice this creates, as well as the associated costs (e.g., paying transport costs for delegates from the Ministry of Agriculture) of resolving disputes locally, are magnified when claims escalate to higher authorities (subprefecture, then prefecture if necessary). Recourse to violence (e.g., destruction of livestock, clashes) as an alternative to legal reparations is common. As described by an informant in Folon, “Sometimes, the Fulani have as their guardians the chiefs who are supposed to settle the conflicts. Gifts of livestock ensure their protection.”

#### *5.1.4. Social and cultural norms influencing resource allocation and management of community conflict*

The northern border area is mainly occupied by native Malinke, Senoufo, Koulango, and Lobi people and some foreign communities from Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali. This area is part Muslim and part animist. This heterogeneity reflects the diversity of intracommunity social and cultural norms, and these differences affect resource allocation (land) and conflict management.

There are also interethnic alliances (Koulango–Lobi–Senoufo) that constitute bases for the



prevention and management of conflict. These norms extend beyond borders where there is cultural and religious proximity with populations of neighboring countries (Mali and Burkina Faso). Impact of the decade of instability: new social needs difficult to address effectively in the short and medium term

The decade of sociopolitical instability (2002-2011) in Côte d'Ivoire, and particularly in northern border areas, aggravated existing social inequalities. The State found itself unable to widen the circle of beneficiaries of its wealth redistribution systems. Faced with an absence of the State in the border regions, as researchers, we witnessed directly the deteriorated state of infrastructure and public services in health, education, electricity, sanitation, and access to employment and economic opportunities.

This has created an even greater challenge for the State and local authorities to meet the basic service needs of the population. It should be noted that there has been a positive dynamic in most socioeconomic sectors over the past 3 to 5 years because of significant State investments in some social services with heavy support from development partners. The State has made progress with the presidential emergency program, government social programs, or during State visits by the president of the Republic. Yet, these dynamics, although widely appreciated, remain insufficient, given the scale of need. Strong feelings of neglect and abandonment persist. One informant in Folon stated, "This feels like a neglected, abandoned region. Everything is in Odienné where the treasury and the bank are located."

## 5.2. Rules of the Game

The rules of the game that determine how local governance is enacted by region start

with an analysis of the formal and informal institutions (rules and norms) influencing the behavior of actors, their incentives, their relationships, and their capacity for collective action. This includes both the formal constitutional and legal framework, as well as informal norms and social and cultural traditions.

### 5.2.1. *Weakly enforced formal rules*

Local governance is regulated by several texts on the political, administrative, and financial organization of relations between the State and local authorities. The analysis shows that these rules place the State in a position of "domination" over communities. Finding itself in competition with local authorities over who takes credit for any local development initiatives, the central State's responsibility for public resource allocation enhances its political positioning. This is one way that central government tries to gain the upper hand in the game of local influence, power, and prestige.

The functioning of local authorities is marked by the chronic absence of members of municipal and regional councils from the local territory, contrary to legal provisions. Study informants noted several cases of an absence of elected officials/executives at local government meetings. As noted by a Bounkani resident, "Téhini administrators are not involved in the development of their locality; they do not come to meetings. The City Council was postponed more than twice before it could be held." Absenteeism limits the administration's capacity to respond to public needs, to develop responsive policy, and to represent the public interest.

Regarding natural resources, several texts exist to guide their management. We note the existence of frameworks for conflict resolution, negotiation, and appeasement linked to transhumance and the demarcation



of borders (CCM), and the cross-border initiatives of international organizations, in particular the International Organization for Migration (IOM), through meetings and trainings for cross-border populations. As indicated by one resident, “International organizations such as the IOM work with border populations [in meetings or trainings] to foster collaboration between border villages, greater mutual understanding, and social cohesion [Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Mali].”

However, the rules related to the management of natural resources are poorly and rarely applied (e.g., land, demarcation of territories for gold mining). We cite the opacity and inefficiency of the management and accountability of the CDLM, which was mentioned by most people we met for this study. This structure was set up to ensure the application of the principles of Law 2014-138 (March 24, 2014), or the mining code. This law obliges the mining industry to transfer 0.5% of their revenue to localities within a radius of 15 km from the exploitation sites.

These resources should, in a participatory approach, improve access to basic services in the localities. However, their opaque oversight and management have created a crisis of trust between communities and CDLM teams in Tengréla, particularly. This situation is explained by games of interest (collusion) by local leaders to monopolize part of the rents from natural resources.

Regarding aquatic resources, village conflict resolution committees are poorly run and create an increase in tensions between herders and farmers. Observations by informants suggest involvement by the dozors as forces of control and management of conflicts between herders and farmers and of transhumance (in the case of Minignan,

Kimbirila-Nord, and Sokoro in the Folon region). This brotherhood of hunters organizes night patrols and livestock seizures and sets and manages fine collection in the event of crop damage by cattle herds or non-compliance with curfew-hours, for example. This shows the influence of non-State actors in resource management and contributes to feelings of injustice among breeders regarding resource conflict management and handling of reparations.

Our interviews highlighted agreements that allowed almost all stakeholders to benefit, directly or indirectly, from resource extraction and their local systems of management. As indicated by a senior officer in Tchologo, “Every fortnight, we agree on the terms. Everyone is closely managed [e.g., police, gendarme, customs, military], and I am in charge. We make payouts to all these actors, but no phones are allowed, so there’s no trace. You haven’t seen me, I haven’t seen you, because it’s all illegal.”

Regarding the courts, few informants expressed confidence in state judicial authorities. They also described justice as a service that was geographically difficult to access and the procedures of which they did not understand.

The poor quality of basic public service provision is decried by populations, although the State claims to have reformed all sectors, such as education and health. The above-mentioned factors explain the negative views of State and local government effectiveness. At the local level, gaps in terms of personnel and staffing were noted for most decentralized State structures in all departments visited, particularly health and education. This constitutes a failure to meet State commitments to basic service standards for these areas, but it also means that populations





lack access to the most basic services, which they understand to be a State responsibility.

### *5.2.2. Informal practices and arrangements, based on social norms, as a palliative for the shortcomings of traditional consultation frameworks*

Several consultation frameworks exist at the local level to promote dialogue between communities. These are homogeneous or heterogeneous consultation frameworks between communities or between political and administrative authorities and populations. These frameworks, particularly between communities, are more popular with populations than are the formal frameworks. This is because of the socioeconomic and professional proximity of the participants. By way of illustration, we can cite the case of Minignan, where the chieftaincy and community leaders (kablas) have used mentoring relationships as a framework for positive influence in the settlement of conflicts between farmers and herders or even the implementation of monitoring committees in the villages (in the case of Kapégué) and Fulani camps (in the case of Flabougou) recognized by the administrative authorities.

We note the proliferation of information channels and informal consultation frameworks which reflect a great demand for information and sectoral consultation on specific problems of certain socio-professional categories of the population. This indicates a crisis of confidence in traditional channels in an environment that is also marked by a lack of information among the populations on the roles and achievements of the State and local authorities.

### *5.2.3. Games of Political Influence*

Games of political influence involve elected officials and executives from each region and population group, mainly community leaders and young people.

The actions of elected officials/executives are oriented toward political positioning and visibility. To do this, they mobilize community leaders, through promises of development and investment, offers of economic opportunities to their relatives, or even donations during local ceremonies. As indicated by a person from Bagoué, “The advisers are old people. If you have a large court with a lot of voters, you are taken as an adviser whether or not you have any capacity to provide ideas.”

Regarding young people, several actions are carried out by elected officials/executives to curry favor with them, such as offers of economic opportunities and donations to “grins.” The grins are spaces for informal exchanges between young people. They are increasingly becoming the expression of a political affiliation and of defending the political ideologies of elected officials and executives. The grins therefore become frames of division of youth by elected officials and frames by ideologies and electoral promises. A person interviewed in Bounkani said, “There is political manipulation of young people by elected officials (cadres). They make donations of 20,000 CFA francs or 30,000 CFA francs to young people. Today, each elected official or local executive has his ‘grin’ to defend his interests.”

According to local youth and women, the campaigns are periods when executives and elected officials announce future employment and funding opportunities for the population. However, these announcements unfortunately remain promises that do not materialize. This situation creates a crisis of confidence



between the elected officials/executives and the populations. “Each time there is an election, deputy, regional council, the candidates come to see us and we discuss with them, but the problem has never been resolved for the last 10 to 20 years.”

Outside electoral periods, games of influence continue concerning resources allocated to youth associations by local authorities. Indeed, these resources are very low, and their availability is understood by young people as being linked to electoral periods against a background of opacity: “We participate in the presentation of the budgets, but we do not receive a copy; we are simply presented the budget, that’s all. The allocated budget is only 300,000 FCFA. The concern of the regional council is political and not development.”

With the upcoming local elections in 2023, the manipulation of youth will intensify and pose a risk of conflict at the local level.

### 5.3. Current Situation: Here and Now

#### 5.3.1. Access to basic services<sup>1</sup>

From our interviews, documents analyzed, and observations made, it can be seen that overall, the populations of the border areas have little access to social services and socioeconomic infrastructure in quantity and quality.

- *In terms of health:* Although there are disparities between the health districts, the data on the health situation show satisfactory coverage of health establishments but a low availability of qualified personnel and a weak technical platform. Added to this is a crisis of confidence in the nursing staff because of

the poor reception and cultural and linguistic barriers with various populations. This situation, which hinders the quality of care, is frustrating to residents. We note that in certain localities of Tengréla, there is an exodus to Mali, where the medical services are reputed to be less expensive and the health personnel more welcoming (i.e., there is cultural proximity).

- *In terms of education:* In all the border regions, education rates (primary and secondary) are well below the national average, with generally high supervision rates and an unequal distribution of teachers, especially at the rural level. Added to this is the fact that a large majority of schools lack basic amenities such as water, electricity, and latrines. All of these factors explain the low education results in the 2020 end-of-year exams. Also, at the rural level, we note the desertion of teachers to the city, because of the lack of basic infrastructure to ensure a certain quality of life for their families, and school dropout because of families permanently relocating.
- *In terms of access to electricity:* The study notes a positive dynamic, generally confirmed by the people met. The electricity coverage rate in the northern areas has increased globally from less than 20% to greater than 80% (except Bounkani, which still has a comparatively low rate). This is explained by the advent and intensification of the government’s Electricity for All program since 2014-2015 (with the creation of new districts). Also, in the villages, the emphasis is more on public lighting, that is, lighting of the main roads and not in households and neighborhoods.

<sup>1</sup> The basic services considered in the context of the study cover the following: health, education, water and electricity, employment, infrastructure, access to mobile telephony, environmental management, and sanitation.



- *In terms of access to water:* As with electricity, this study notes an effort by the Government, local communities, and development partners to improve access to drinking water, particularly in rural areas. The mission was able to observe ongoing investments in certain localities by the Government and local communities. Nevertheless, these efforts remain weak in view of water needs, especially in rural areas. This is the case, for example, in the localities of Petit Nassian and Maniendougou, where women and children travel long distances in search of water. As a result, people still consider their situation of access to drinking water to be “critical” even if they generally recognize that there have been improvements.
- *In terms of employment:* The situation of young people is considered worrying because of continued high unemployment with few job opportunities. Many turn to clandestine gold panning on nature reserves and at other sites that are deemed dangerous. However, these activities are painful and not very productive; therefore, they are not very profitable.
- *Economic infrastructure:* Apart from social infrastructure (e.g., health, water, education), most people report improvements in road infrastructure (e.g., new roads, rehabilitated roads, profiling of tracks and bridges) since 2012-2013. Several road infrastructure projects are now underway, but informants denounce the fact that this remains limited to major urban arteries. The districts of cities and in rural areas are generally well served. Populations decry the lack of maintenance of roads once they are built, which leads to their rapid deterioration.
- *Mobile telephony coverage:* Data from the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority

of Côte d'Ivoire for January 2021 show relatively satisfactory coverage for localities and populations in the northern border areas, particularly in Poro and Tchologo. They also show, as noted by populations, that several localities, especially in rural areas, are without mobile phone coverage despite increased extension in recent years.

- *Environment/sanitation:* The research mission noted that environment and sanitation management is the responsibility of local authorities, who are considered ineffective by populations. There are initiatives carried out by the communities themselves or sometimes the State, with support from development partners. We can cite the material support of certain local authorities for young people and women for urban sanitation (in the case of Minignan, Téhini, Doropo, and Bouna) or the Labor-Intensive Work (THIMO) program of the ministry in charge of youth employment and/or the Roads Management Agency. This program covers the northern border areas and contributes to the sanitation of urban areas while offering job opportunities to young people. However, these actions remain sporadic and not permanent. In some places, they are even sources of conflict with local communities and constitute risks of local instability because of the non-remuneration of young people and women recruited for this work (in the case of Kong).

Challenges remain significant, as this area was strongly impacted by the “absence” of the State and the weak investment capacities of local authorities for approximately 10 years (2002-2011) during the sociopolitical crisis. This lag continues to leave a general sense of abandonment by the State among populations in these areas, particularly rural zones. This assertion is supported by the words of some focus group members from Tchologo: “It is





better that we plant the flag of another country here in Tengréla because we are not considered at all.”

### 5.3.2. Economic Opportunities

Most populations report very few economic opportunities in their areas. In addition, several grievances are raised against existing programs. In fact, according to local residents, those that exist are largely offered when electoral periods approach, they are not in sufficient quantity to meet needs, they do not cover all areas, and access to these opportunities is not transparent because they are limited to relatives of the administrative and political authorities (i.e., social or political families).

As reported during a focus group in Bagoué, “if we give 10,000 FCFA to Bagoué, Tengréla will have 500 FCFA, while Boundiali [will be] at 8,000 FCFA and Kouto at 1,500 FCFA.” From another person in Bagoué, “We had nothing in mind regarding women and young people. For the AEJ project, we registered in Minignan since there are counters (gichets) in the municipalities, but still we received nothing. We have few beneficiaries, as we are still associated with Odienné. Odienné can have 80% of the beneficiaries and Minignan 20%.”

These factors mean that there is a certain lack of interest from the populations when these programs are launched in several areas. However, several programs have been launched and implemented in the northern border areas since 2012-2013 by the Government, local communities, and development partners for the benefit of the populations of the area.

These include support programs for entrepreneurship and the empowerment of young people and women, THIMO, skills development programs (e.g., internships, apprenticeships, and qualifying training), and the cash transfer program for vulnerable populations. By way of illustration, the table below shows the beneficiaries by region of the cash transfer program for vulnerable populations.

**Table 2: Beneficiaries of the cash transfer program<sup>2</sup> by region in 2019**

Region	Number of Beneficiaries in 2019
Bagoué	4,983
Bounkani	4,207
Folon	2,179
Poro	13,805
Tchologo	5,642

### 5.3.3. Social cohesion and conflict management

The interviews made it possible to highlight several types of conflicts existing in the northern border area: the persistence of herder–farmer conflicts (between natives and non-natives, especially the Fulani), leadership conflicts at the chieftaincy level (in the case of the villages of Féni, Zébasso, and others in the Bagoué region), and conflicts related to the demarcation of village territories. In addition, the advent and expansion of gold mining activities, especially informal, are sources of conflict between a multitude of actors around land management.

<sup>2</sup> See:

[https://psgouv.ci/welcome/details\\_sous\\_menu3/bnficiaires-par-rqion-dpartement-sous-prfecture-et-village-du-projet-filets-sociaux-productifs752](https://psgouv.ci/welcome/details_sous_menu3/bnficiaires-par-rqion-dpartement-sous-prfecture-et-village-du-projet-filets-sociaux-productifs752)



Apart from these conflicts, there are other types of latent conflicts linked to autochthony against a backdrop of social domination (in the case of the Senoufos and Malinke in Bagoué). This is the case of the village of Diamakani (Bagoué region) which was set up as a Certificate of Elementary Primary Studies (CEPE) composition center, but the inhabitants of the village of Papara forbade the children of their village to go to this center for the composition of the CEPE. Also, this assertion is supported by the words of several people met in the Tchologo region during the study: “It’s our home here.”

In terms of conflict management, community leaders are involved in most conflict management frameworks, both formal and informal. For example, in the law on rural land management, community leaders are central to the peaceful enjoyment of rights through village committees for the management of rural land. Similarly, in the settlement of conflicts related to crop damage, customary chiefs are also at the heart of the defined resolution strategy which creates a village commission for amicable settlement, chaired by the village chief.

These frameworks also define the levels of responsibility and involvement of administrative authorities in conflict management. This is usually done in close collaboration with community leaders.

We also note the role of dozos in conflict management. Indeed, because of their acquired legitimacy with the communities, the dozos are embedded in these procedures, providing parallel justice (e.g., fines, confiscation of livestock).

#### *5.3.4. Inclusion and participation*

The study found participation of young people and women in various local management

bodies, such as on health and education management committees, a civil-military committee, and community leader meetings (e.g., as a woman or youth president) with the administrative and traditional authorities. However, in the opinion of women and young people, this participation remains globally “figurative” in the bodies of governance, listening, and collective construction of actions despite their important role as a catalyst for social change.

However, there are cases of more assertive participation of women and young people making it possible to influence local governance decisions. This is the case of the municipal councilor at the Town Hall of Téhini on the issue of access that women and young people have to economic opportunities; and of the president of Doropo women, with her voluntary actions with the National Commission for Human Rights for support on issues of gender-based violence and its involvement in creating working conditions in the villages by donating motorcycles.

#### *5.3.5. Influence from neighboring countries*

Because of the ethnic, religious, and cultural proximity, the ease of movement, in particular through clandestine trails, and a shared feeling of abandonment by the State, there are several cases of positive influences from localities in the northern border areas of Côte d'Ivoire with Mali and Burkina Faso. We can cite the consolatory reorientation toward certain Malian border towns (e.g., Kadjanan), and meetings between community leaders to discuss economic opportunities around supply and demand dynamics in local markets.

This situation of collaboration has been dynamic in recent years, even if there are conflicts between cross-border populations (Ivoriens and Malians) around the exploitation of natural resources (destruction of fields).



### 5.3.6. Communication

Several channels are used for communication between local authorities and populations, both at the administrative and traditional authority levels.

Among administrative agencies, public communiques (in emergencies), written circulars (between administrative authorities, public service agencies, and community leaders), and community radios are the most used. Concerning the traditional authorities and the local community leaders, the community channels are used in particular at the rural level: trumpets (in the case of Kimbirila-Nord in the region of Folon), mosques, criers, clerks going door to door, kablas (large family), grins, youth and women's associations, and community leaders are all relays of information.

The interviews showed that the communication channels are in order of priority for the populations: the use of griots at the rural level despite the existence of a communal radio, the different chiefdoms of the different communities, the communal radio, and the channel of religious leaders.

The existence of more or less formal but equally effective consultation frameworks between the authorities and the populations and between the populations themselves was noted. These frameworks cover all socioeconomic and professional aspects: religious consultation platforms, exchange platforms between communities, mutual funds for executives, motorcycle-taxis consultation frameworks, and informal exchange frameworks between certain social strata of the two borders. By way of illustration, we can highlight the case of the women of Tengréla, under the aegis of the president of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) *Entente pour le développement* (Development

Agreement), which is working to set up watch committees for women in all neighborhoods of Tengréla with the aim of preserving the safety of women, children, and the population in general.

In recent years, there has been an explosion of information channel executives and consultation frameworks.

### 5.3.7. Evidence of resilience

In view of the relatively worrying findings in terms of access to basic services, economic opportunities, social cohesion, conflict management, inclusion, participation, and communication, the study concerns structural and social dynamics in the northern border areas. In particular, we can highlight the following:

- *In terms of health*, there is a reorientation of the therapeutic itineraries of the populations toward the health structures of neighboring countries, births performed by midwives at home, and the use of traditional medicine and self-medication as population care practices.
- *Concerning education*, there are community initiatives for the construction of schools, the commitment of volunteer teachers, and the creation of community education centers.
- *For access to water and electricity*, the actions mainly concern the construction of boreholes or wells dug by hand by individuals to supply their households, the use of backwaters and water points (dams) as a source of water supply, and the use of individual solar panels, personal generators, and jerry-rigged connections to electrical power lines for household needs.
- *At the level of economic opportunities*, there is the development of subsistence services and businesses (purchase/sale of water



from individuals with boreholes for household and livestock needs), the “hunting” for information, the collection of files, and the transmission to young departmental delegates to capture economic opportunities and jobs.

- *Regarding infrastructure*, there is a need for community funding for the construction of a wooden bridge in Sokoro (Mali border) for the passage of trucks and traders for the Sokoro market, and repair of pumps in Kimbirila-Nord thanks to the community fund.
- *In terms of communication*, there is proliferation and categorization according to political leanings of “tea grins,” which constitute spaces for free exchange for young people on all current and noncurrent subjects.

#### 5.4. Local Governance Dynamics

The dynamics of local governance highlight the interaction between the fundamental factors, the rules of the game, and the current situation. A distinction is made between “positive” dynamics contributing to progress and “negative” dynamics arising from obstacles to the improvement of local governance.

##### 5.4.1. Dynamics to improve local governance

We explain how this manifests in each sector below:

- *The continuation of renewed investment, especially by the State, in the social sectors, specifically in the northern border areas, as recently announced by the Head of Government (the special program for the integration of young people from the border regions of countries in the grip of*

terrorism),<sup>3</sup> will contribute to improving the living conditions of the populations and to mitigating the feeling of abandonment.

- *Upcoming municipal and regional elections in 2023* will see political posturing as candidates claim credit for socioeconomic change, hoping to increase their chances of success. As indicated by the words of a person we met in Bagoué, “Many are the executives who come to carry out development actions, just for the time of an electoral campaign”.
- *The application of intra- and intercommunity social norms* will contribute to curbing conflicts and mitigating their impacts within communities. Several examples have effectively shown that social norms have made it possible to resolve conflicts.
- *The same applies to compliance with the rules enacted in the management of conflicts related to natural resources* by the bodies responsible for them. Application of the legal provisions will contribute to strengthening the confidence of the populations and improving their recourse to these bodies.
- *Resilience mechanisms developed by communities* enable them to cope with shortcomings with access to public services while developing social cohesion. These mechanisms cover several aspects and demonstrate the ability of communities to get involved in improving their living conditions. These mechanisms thus reflect the shortcomings of the State, in its responsibility, to ensure the provision of basic services to citizens in an equitable and efficient manner in the northern border areas.

<sup>3</sup> See <https://www.aip.ci/cote-divoire-aip-un-programme-special-dappui-a-linsertion-des-jeunes-explique-a-bouna/>





#### 5.4.2. *Dynamics arising from obstructions to better local governance*

These dynamics mainly concern the following:

- *Resource allocation mechanisms continue to keep local authorities entirely dependent on central powers. Arrangements for transferring funds to communities are not likely to change in the short term. They will therefore continue to hamper the capacity of local authorities to finance local development.*
  - *The limited resource mobilization capacities of local authorities limit their ability to increase availability and access to basic services. Local authorities have limited financial, human, technical, and material resources to meet the needs of their populations, and there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that this will change in the short to medium term. Local authorities will therefore continue, despite their potential, to have very low internal resources and will remain mainly dependent on resources allocated by the State, the lines of which are decided by the public treasury. This dependence on the State is even fraught with the risk of a reduction in State subsidies. Indeed, the recent creation of new decentralized administrative structures, the Autonomous Districts, will require adequate funding. These allocations will likely be limited in a budgetary context marked by reduced State capacity because of the ongoing coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.*
  - *The next municipal and regional elections are periods of tension against a backdrop of political manipulation by community leaders. Indeed, the struggle for elective positions as the elections approach, is in the process of building clans between the executives. Indeed, leadership conflicts have been observed under construction in certain*
- localities for the control of local communities.
- *The chronic absence of members of municipal and regional councils from the territory hampers their ability to effectively represent the populations in the management of local affairs.*
  - *The increasingly pronounced tendency toward community, identity, and political withdrawal constitutes an aspect to be addressed together by the communities to prevent conflicts. In the areas visited, and particularly in the department of Kong, there is a pronounced defense of the ideology and advantages linked to autochthony in the face of foreigners and non-natives in the department. This assertion is reinforced by the words of the respondents in these terms “here, it’s at home.” In the opinion of the interviewees, young natives most often say these things about non-natives. As they develop, such behaviors and practices may well inhibit or at least affect local opportunities for strengthening peace and peaceful coexistence. They are already creating mistrust within the communities. This is the case of the Mossi communities, who do not feel they belong to the local community and therefore refused to be registered during the last general population census (2021).*
  - *Greater transparency and accountability in the resolution of natural-resource conflicts and increasing economic opportunity will help, but both areas will remain sources of tension and competition between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people groups. As indicated by an ECOWAS national: “for AEJ jobs, we mainly take Ivorians, but [in] the FACE (the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire—Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire) project which was carried out recently, everyone was taken into account, including the ECOWAS community living*



on Ivorian territory. Each had a sum of 250,000 FCFA.”

- *The coexistence of local authorities and the newly created autonomous districts can be sources of obstacles to local governance if it is not marked by an approach of complementarity and synergy of actions between these structures.*
- *There are relationships of mistrust between the populations, in particular young people (e.g., gold miners, motorbike taxis, cross-border traders) and the SDF, against a backdrop of noncompliance, real or supposed, with their rules of ethics and ethics.* Indeed, several cases are noted concerning extortion of the populations. This situation, which creates immense frustration among young people, is increasingly fueling tensions between the SDF and the population. This is all the more so given that the appeals of the populations to the authorities do not manage to change things. Indeed, the populations are aware of the inaction of local authorities and local bodies (CCM) in the face of the abuse of certain SDF on gold-panning sites and motorcycle taxi tracks.
- *Deterioration of the security environment could intensify intercommunity frictions.* Indeed, the advent of the threat and terrorist attacks risk, endangering the social balance. We are witnessing the stigmatization of the Fulani, who are perceived to be supporters of jihadist movements (cases of systematic control and searching of the Fulani in Folon), which is contributing to their exclusion from local governance. The active inclusion of these minority peoples could create a positive dynamic in social life, with their transition from the status of nomads to that of members of the community with participation in community life.

## 6. Implications for the R4P Program

The analysis of the social dynamics of the areas of intervention has made it possible to identify levers that appear as entry points for obtaining lasting change. These levers are closely linked to the areas of interest of the project.

The implications relate globally to local governance and more specifically to the R4P project through the classification of areas in terms of priority of intervention, proposals for actions to support security governance, and the key actors to be considered.

### 6.1. Implications for Local Governance

The main implications of this PEA for local governance are the following:

- The limited nature of the devolution of power in terms of decentralization which hinders the performance of local governments in their capacity to provide quality services to the populations despite political proximity.
- The current approach to local governance, driven by the State and marked by red tape and the repression of offenders, creates the feeling of exclusion of local communities in the redistribution of the rent generated by natural resources.
- Taking social standards into account throughout the local governance management cycle contributes to the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the State and local communities.
- The limited resources of local authorities, combined with a relatively non-inclusive planning process, limit their ability to meet the needs of populations.



To rebuild its legitimacy with all populations, the State must rethink its global approach to local governance in the northern border areas, in terms of the provision of economic opportunities for the most vulnerable, the availability of economic infrastructure, and the strengthening of the capacities of bodies promoting social cohesion.

## 6.2. Zone Classification

Some areas are priorities for intervention because of the state of infrastructure and basic services, the perception of the State's ability to meet basic needs, community participation in

local governance, the state of social cohesion, and the dynamics observed in the interventions of the Government, local authorities, and donors in various fields. We emphasize the localities of Kapégoué and Flabougou (Bagoué), Téhini (Boukani), and Folon.

On the basis of these criteria, a local governance assessment grid is proposed below. Table 3 highlights a disparity in local governance in the study areas. The scores were constructed on the basis of a scale from 1 (less governed) to 5 (better governed) according to the five criteria retained.

**Table 3: Classification of areas of intervention according to the state of local governance**

Criterion <sup>4</sup>	Minignan Kimbirila- Nord	Tengréla			Ferkessédougou		Bouna	
		Sokoro	Flabougou	Kapégoué	Kong	Sikolo	Téhini	Doropo
Access to basic social infrastructure and services (e.g., education, health, water, electricity, roads, leisure)	1	3	2	1	3	2	2	3
Perception of the State's capacity to meet basic needs	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	2
Community participation in local governance	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
State of social cohesion	3	2	2	2	3	2	1	2
Dynamics of government and donor interventions (programs/projects) in different areas (all sectors)	1	2	1	2	3	2	2	3

<sup>4</sup> Criteria can be defined as reported perceptions in ascending order from 1 (bass) to 5 (good).





Criterion <sup>4</sup>	Minignan	Tengréla			Ferkessédougou		Bouna	
	Kimbirila-Nord	Sokoro	Flabougou	Kapégué	Kong	Sikolo	Téhini	Doropo
<b>Total score</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>

**Access to basic infrastructure:** the least governed areas are Flabougou in the Bagoué region, followed by Kimbirila-Nord, Kapégué, and Téhini, where many challenges remain despite a positive dynamic underway.

- **Perception of the effectiveness of the State:** the feeling of abandonment is widespread in the northern border areas. There is, however, a lesser trend in Kong and Doropo.
- **Participation and inclusion in local governance:** the finding seems the same in all the regions visited. However, because of the specificities of Flabougou (a Fulani town) and Kapégué (a community made up exclusively of Senoufo), this trend is more pronounced because of a much greater sense of belonging to Mali in terms of access to basic services.
- **State of social cohesion:** there is little variability between areas of intervention except for the department of Téhini, where the divide is more acute because of the security threat exacerbated by terrorist attacks.
- **Dynamics of recent interventions:** the limited number of development programs and projects is more noticeable in Kimbirila-Nord and Flabougou.

In view of all the above-mentioned factors, the least-governed areas in terms of access to basic services are in order of Flabougou, Téhini, Kimbirila-Nord, and Kapégué. In terms of program intervention, particular attention will have to be given to certain localities.

## 6.3. Actions to Support Local Governance

The local governance support actions of the project may relate to:

- Support for the strengthening of consultation frameworks between local governance actors.
- Support for capacity building on regulatory mechanisms for the governance and management of natural resources.
- Support for the implementation of natural-resource management monitoring mechanisms.
- Advocacy for the “active” involvement of vulnerable populations (e.g., young people, women, those who are marginalized) in consultation frameworks at the local level.
- Support for integration mechanisms that improve the financial inclusion of the most vulnerable and improve social cohesion.
- Support for activities of rapprochement and social cohesion, such as sports and festive activities that constitute elements where ethnic communities can come together.
- Support for activities bringing people together, especially young people, and the SDF.
- Support for communication activities on the achievements of the State and local authorities toward the populations.

## 6.4. Key Actors to Consider

The analysis of the delimitation of the system made it possible to identify actors endowed with social influence and to be able to induce a



negative or positive change on the local governance of the study region.

The following actors can play a positive role in local governance:

- Community leaders, or “kablas leaders,” because of their ability to mobilize a significant social and political audience with local populations;
- Women leaders through their ability to mobilize other women and their involvement in local economic dynamism and in mobilizing opportunities for other women;
- Religious guides who benefit from a certain audience with the populations when messages are to be passed on to the community and who are influential actors, capable of mobilizing the communities, in particular the elected officials/executives;
- The Chieftdom, which constitutes a good social fuse to regulate social relations in the sense of mobilizing them around projects of common interest. Increasingly, traditional leaders are represented in all spheres of consultation, in this case, consultations related to local governance. Thus, at the local level, they take part in meetings and give their opinion. Village Chiefs have the ability to influence State structures, elected officials and executives, and even entire communities in access to basic social services.
- Elected officials and political actors have an interest in being “close” to the populations to better their development and ensure their political positioning. Despite limited resources, they have an influence on the process of local governance.
- The political and administrative authorities who have a more or less positive influence in the field of local governance because they hold the executive power at the local level.
- Managers of public services who implement government policies in terms of meeting collective social needs (e.g., health, education, water, electricity) for the benefit of populations. These actors have technical and political resources to induce change even if some have “difficult” relations with the population because of the shortcomings in their services.
- NGOs are actively embodying the relationship between the rulers and the ruled and can play a role in local governance and/or in finding solutions to community challenges.
- Economic operators, some of whom, because of their economic success, position themselves as players who can improve the basic service offer at the local level. They therefore invest in social infrastructure, in particular, classrooms, health centers, and rehabilitation of village pumps (such as in the case of Zanikaha, where an economic operator engaged in gold panning, built a school and a health center for his village, and rehabilitated the Kanagonon fence). In general, these operators are motivated by the desire to remedy the shortcomings of the State and to legitimize their illegal gold-mining activities. However, this may hide unacknowledged political ambitions at the local level. As stated by a gold digger in the Tchologo region: “I can build a dispensary for my parents, but I wouldn’t do it so as not to have a problem with the boss of the town. If I start right away, they’re going to call me out and say what he didn’t do is what you want to do?” Overall, economic operators seem to be motivated by altruism (happiness to help one’s community), the legitimization of their economic activities, and the underlying political ambitions.

Alongside these actors, some can hinder the smooth running of local governance:



- Elected officials and political actors are positive actors but also capable of hindering social cohesion because of their interests aimed at influencing and manipulating populations (community leaders and young people) for their own political positioning. This is especially true near electoral deadlines.
- The SDF are actors of defense and security, but their behavior, contrary to their code of ethics and deontology, creates tensions and frustrations within the populations. Their strained relations with young artisanal gold miners and cross-border transporters constitute a risk for local governance, in particular, conflicts.
- Young people (e.g., motorcycle taxis, gold washers) have an interest in exploiting land resources as much as possible for economic purposes. Some of them can be judged as potential adversaries to the local governance process. This is because their behavior is focused on their gain and not the general interest, their noncompliance with the rules in their field of activity (e.g., mining activity, transport, trade), and the existing tension between them and the SDF.
- Traditional hunters, or dozors, who, although their presence is in the support of the populations, their intrusion into the field of conflict resolution outside any rules (e.g., land, transhumance) and constitutes abuses that are likely to taint social cohesion by the stigma and discrimination created by their actions.



## 7. Annexes

### Annex 1: Consulted Documents

#### Reports

1. Assemblée des Régions et Districts de Côte d'Ivoire (ARDCI) et CGLU Afrique, 2016 : Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du coût des compétences transférées par l'Etat aux collectivités territoriales et aux districts autonomes de Côte d'Ivoire
2. Cabinet du Premier Ministre, 2021 : Bilan du Programme Social du Gouvernement 2019-2020 au 31 décembre 2020. Janvier 2021
3. Ministère de l'Education Nationale, de l'Enseignement Technique et de la Formation Professionnelle, 2021 : Statistiques Scolaires de Poche 2020 – 2021
4. Ministère de la Sante, de l'Hygiène Publique et de la Couverture Maladie Universelle (MSHPCMU), 2021 : Rapport Annuel sur la Situation Sanitaire (RASS) 2020. Juillet 2021
5. Ministère du Budget : Annexe à la loi de finances portant budget de l'Etat pour les années 2018, 2019 et 2020 relative aux Collectivités territoriales
6. Institut National de la Statistique (INS), 2015 : Enquête sur le niveau de vie des ménages en Côte d'Ivoire (ENV), 2015
7. Site internet sur les réalisations et les résultats du Programme Social du Gouvernement de 2011 à 2020 : <https://psgouv.ci/welcome>
8. USAID, 2016 : Draft Working Document: USAID Applied Political Economy Analysis (PEA) Field Guide. Version February 1, 2016

#### Institutional and Legal Texts

1. Décret N°2021-276 du 09 juin 2021 portant création de douze (12) Districts Autonomes
2. Décret n 96-433 du 3 juin 1996 relatif au règlement des différends entre les agriculteurs et les éleveurs
3. Loi n°2014-138 du 24 mars 2014 portant Code minier
4. La loi n° 98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural telle que modifiée par la loi n 2004-412 du 14 août 2004
5. Loi n 2003-489 du 26 décembre 2003 portant régime financier, fiscal et domanial des collectivités territoriales, l'Etat concourt aux budgets des différentes collectivités territoriales en leur octroyant une quote-part du produit de certains impôts et des dotations budgétaires annuelles dans le cadre de leur fonctionnement et de la réalisation de leurs investissements
6. Loi n° 2001-476 du 9 août 2001 d'orientation sur l'organisation générale de l'Administration territoriale.



## Scientific Articles

1. Amrani, Nouha, Sadik, Mohammed, Hemmi, Mohamed. "Gouvernance des Collectivités Territoriales au Maroc: Une Approche Prospective à la Lumière des Expériences Internationales." *Alternatives Managériales Economiques (AME)* 3, no. 1 (2021): 144-165.
2. Pierre Badin. *La Psychologie de la vie Sociale. Aspects Psychosociaux de la Personnalité* (Paris: Le Centurion, 1977): 40.
3. Bakkour, Darine Hamad. "Un Essai de Définition du Concept de Gouvernance." Université Montpellier, 2013.
4. Pranab Bardhan. *La Gestion des Affaires Publiques au Service du Développement. Une Approche par l'Economie Politique* (Paris: Centre de Développement de l'OCDE, 1997): 51.
5. G. Blundo (2002), « La gouvernance, entre technique de gouvernement et outil d'exploration empirique », in *La gouvernance au quotidien en Afrique : les services publics et collectifs et leurs usagers*, Bulletin No 23-24, Juin-Décembre. 2002.
6. Pitseys, John. "Le Concept de Gouvernance." *Revue Interdisciplinaire d'Études Juridiques* 65, (2010): 207-228.
7. Schneider, H. "Gouvernance participative : le chaînon manquant dans la lutte contre la pauvreté" Paris: OECD, Coll. Cahier de politique économique, 1999, p.8.
8. J.C. Thomas, *Action publique et participation des citoyens : pour une gestion démocratique revitalisée*, Paris, Nouveaux Horizons, 1995, p.1.



## Annex 2: Interview Guide

### Introductory letter

Hello / Good evening, Madam / Sir

My name is [name of interviewer], I work for the Economic Policy Analysis Unit (CAPEC) of the Ivorian Center for Economic and Social Research (CIRES). CAPEC is currently conducting, under the aegis of the NGO EQUAL ACCESS INTERNATIONAL Equal Access International (EAI), a study to analyze local governance and the security context in your locality / region. This study will allow EAI to clearly identify the needs in order to better target its interventions for the benefit of the populations of your locality / region within the framework of the project, Resilience for Peace (R4P), which is financed by the American cooperation (USAID) and is implemented in your locality.

To do this, I will ask you a few questions, it will not take enough time, and the interview between you and me will be completely confidential.

Would you please give your consent to start the interview?

Thank you for giving me some of your time to participate in this survey.

- I. Actors with decision-making power and influence over governance, conflict management, and intercommunity tension

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
1.1	How would you describe the current overall state of governance (participation, accountability, inclusion, collaboration, access to services) in your locality/region?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Think about access to basic services (water, electricity, roads, education, health, etc.), social cohesion, conflict management, public order, definition of priorities?</li> <li>2. What strategies do central and decentralized power holders use to maintain public order and access to and quality of basic services?</li> </ol>
1.2	Do you think there are factors in your locality (actions, behaviors, etc.) that can disrupt social cohesion and understanding between communities?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If yes, which ones (list and rank in order of importance)? Why?</li> <li>2. By what local strategies do the communities try to overcome the difficulties of social cohesion, and what are the limits of these strategies?</li> </ol>





No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
1.3	In your opinion, who are the key actors capable of favoring (causing or aggravating) community conflicts in your locality (endogenous-community, state, private actors, etc.)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Are these actors who can hinder social cohesion in your locality/region formal and/or informal actors?</li> <li>2. Are these actors the same over the last 3 years?</li> <li>3. What do you think are the motivations of these key players?</li> <li>4. In your opinion, what actions should be taken towards these people/groups of people? Why?</li> </ol>
1.4	Who are the key actors capable of resolving or mitigating community conflicts in your locality (endogenous-community, state, private actors, etc.)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Are these actors who bring social cohesion in your locality/region formal and/or informal actors?</li> <li>2. Are these actors the same over the past 3 years?</li> <li>3. What do you think are the motivations of these key players?</li> <li>4. In your opinion, what actions should be taken towards these people/groups of people? Why?</li> </ol>
1.5	Is there a consultation framework between elites, local executives, community leaders on local governance issues related to basic services? And on the prevention and management of political and community conflicts?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If NO, why do you think?</li> <li>2. If YES, give examples.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. How do these consultation frameworks work?</li> <li>b. How are their compositions determined?</li> <li>c. Which community groups do you feel are excluded from local governance frameworks?</li> <li>d. To what extent are current governance practices effective in including the needs of marginalized groups (ethnicity, community, religion...), in particular those who did not have access to local governance before a conflict?</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
1.6	In general, what are the most frequent types/nature of communal conflicts in your locality and in the surrounding localities?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How have the types/nature of community conflict changed over time compared to the situation today?</li> <li>2. During the conflicts, what was the capacity of the representatives of the State and/or local authorities to deal with them?</li> <li>3. Which structures have prevented/reduced conflicts or taken over from government structures (state and local authorities) during a conflict or for conflict mediation? Give examples.</li> <li>4. Are some communities more frequently involved in conflict than others? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>5. How do you foresee the evolution of the situation of social cohesion and understanding between communities in the future (within 3 years) in your locality? Why?</li> </ol>
1.7	More specifically, are there any conflicts related to the management of natural resources (mines, water, land, etc.)?	<p>Which actors perpetuate or fuel these tensions?</p> <p>Are there mechanisms for resolving these disputes? How do they work? Are all the communities involved in the management of these natural resources?</p> <p>Is the legitimacy of the authorities in controlling certain activities related to natural resources (legal vs. illegal)?</p> <p>Is there an eye of the State on transhumance? the CDLMs?</p>





## 2. Conducive environment<sup>5</sup>

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
2.1	How do you judge the capacities (human, material, financial) of state structures in your locality/region?	1. <i>Why? Give examples.</i> 2. <i>Have these abilities changed in the last 3 years?</i> 3. <i>How do you foresee the evolution of these capacities in the future (within 3 years)?</i>
2.2	How do you judge the capacities (human, material, financial) of local authorities in your locality/region?	1. <i>Why? Give examples.</i> 2. <i>Have these abilities changed in the last 3 years?</i> 3. <i>How do you foresee the evolution of these capacities in the future (within 3 years)?</i>
2.3	Are there cross-border initiatives that have negative or positive effects on governance in your locality?	1. <i>What is the nature of these initiatives?</i> 2. <i>Are these initiatives state or community-based? Give examples.</i> 3. <i>Have these initiatives changed in the last 3 years?</i> 4. <i>How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</i>

## 3. Access to basic social services<sup>6</sup>

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
3.1	What is your perception of the capacity of the State to provide basic services for the populations in your locality (think about availability and quality)?	1. <i>Why? Give examples.</i> 2. <i>Has the capacity or performance of the State to provide basic services changed in recent years? or – how the quality of these services has changed (improved or deteriorated) in recent years?</i> 3. <i>How do you foresee the evolution of people's access to basic services in the future (within 3 years) in your locality? Why?</i>
3.2	How do you rate access to basic services in your region?	1. <i>Has this situation changed (improved or deteriorated) in recent years?</i> 2. <i>Do you think that your locality or region has more or less access to basic services than other localities or regions?</i> 3. <i>Do you think that there are communities that have more access than others to basic services in your locality? Why? Give examples.</i> 4. <i>How is the access of women, young people and other vulnerable populations (children, populations with disabilities, etc.) to basic services compared to the population in general?</i> 5. <i>What are the social norms that frame this situation in your locality? (NB: the social norm is not only cultural)</i>

<sup>5</sup> It is a question of determining whether the conditions under which governance operates and whether the necessary and sufficient conditions are met for governance to take place normally for the development of populations.

<sup>6</sup> Basic social services cover the following services: water and electricity, education, health, employment, infrastructure, communication, land, environmental management, and water/sanitation.



No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
3.3	What are the initiatives by which the communities try to overcome all the difficulties of access to basic services for the populations? (i.e., community resilience)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Have these initiatives changed in the last 3 years?</li> <li>2. How do communities that lack access to basic services create solutions themselves? Give examples.</li> </ol>
3.4	Do you think that there are non-State/informal actors (economic interest groups, individuals, groups, etc.) who can influence state actors in terms of availability and access of populations to basic social services?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If YES, which ones (list and rank in order of importance)?</li> <li>2. Why and how these actors influence the state?</li> </ol>

#### 4. Relations between local governance actors

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
4.1	How do you generally judge the relations between State structures and the populations in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What explains this situation? Give examples.</li> <li>2. What are the consequences of this situation?</li> <li>3. Has this situation changed over the past 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>4. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>
4.2	How do you generally judge the relations between local authorities and the populations in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What explains this situation? Give examples.</li> <li>2. What are the consequences of this situation?</li> <li>3. Has this situation changed over the past 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>4. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>
4.3	How do you generally judge the relations between the community structures (traditional or customary) and the populations in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What explains this situation? Give examples.</li> <li>2. What are the consequences of this situation?</li> <li>3. Has this situation changed over the past 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>4. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>
4.4	How do you generally judge the relationship between community structures (traditional or customary) and those of the State?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What explains this situation? Give examples.</li> <li>2. What are the consequences of this situation?</li> <li>3. Has this situation changed over the past 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>4. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>



No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
4.5	In your locality here, what can make the ethnic communities come together to carry out activities? Including local conflict resolution?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What can ethnic groups do together? Give examples.</li> <li>2. What cannot members of your ethnic community do with other communities? Give examples.</li> <li>3. When does the problem of one member of your community become the problem of the whole community (political, economic, social)? Why? (see also according to the periods)</li> <li>4. What can you and the members of your ethnic group not accept, and that you are ready to fight for at all costs? (At the political, economic, and social level/see also depending on the period)</li> </ol>

## 5. Inclusion and participation

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
5.1	What is the level of involvement of young people and women in local governance in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Has this situation changed (improvement/deterioration) in the last 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>2. Are there examples showing that young people or women have effectively influenced decision-making? Explain.</li> </ol>
5.2	What is the level of involvement of ethnic minorities in the governance of your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Are some public structures/local authorities making efforts to increase this representation? Give examples.</li> <li>2. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>

## 6. Communication

No.	Main Questions	Probing Questions
6.1	How do you receive information for crucial issues for people in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are the official channels of information from the communities that you know about the crucial issues for the populations of your locality?</li> <li>2. Are there unofficial channels of information from communities that you know of on issues critical to people in your locality?</li> <li>3. Are local media available and used?</li> </ol>
6.2	How do you proceed when you are not satisfied with the quality or availability of basic services in your locality?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Has this situation changed (improvement/deterioration) in the last 3 years? Why? Give examples.</li> <li>2. How do you foresee the evolution of these relations in the future (within 3 years)?</li> </ol>



