



Farar Tattabara

ASSESSING CONFLICT DRIVERS AND RE-FRAMING RADICALIZATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Formative Research Report
for the

Farar Tattabara
("White Dove")

Radio Project



This report was authored by Kyle Dietrich, with sections drafted by Karen Greiner (Desk Review) and Samuel Compton (Stakeholder Workshop). Field research was conducted by Equal Access-Nigeria staff: Rakiya Usman, Maryam Muhammad, Halima Ibrahim, Al-Qawas Auwal, Muhammad Adam, and RD Bawa. For additional information, please contact Samuel Compton, Nigeria Country Director, scompton@equalaccess.org, or Kyle Dietrich, Senior Program Manager for Africa, kdietrich@equalaccess.org



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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During two weeks in January 2017, two teams of Equal Access-Nigeria staff led formative field research trips across northern Nigeria, conducting hundreds of hours of interviews with a diverse range of respondents in 10 northern states and Abuja. This field research was informed by an in-depth literature review that provided background information on the changing CVE (countering violent extremism) dynamics in northern Nigeria, the latest CVE theories of change, and helped to situate our field research within a social and behavior change communication framework. Together, our desk review and formative field research form a baseline understanding of evolving conflict dynamics in northern Nigeria and inform the framework and content of our new CVE-focused Hausa-language radio platform, *Farar Tattabara* (“White Dove”).

Our research identified several recurring and intersecting themes relevant to CVE efforts, which represent many of the core challenges faced by northern Nigerians today. This briefing paper analyzes and discusses those challenges and their implications for CVE radio programming and behavior change communication. Central to discussions with respondents across the north were the following themes:

- The impact of the economic crisis and currency devaluation on livelihoods;
- Rising criminality and drug use, access to education, and extremism among youth;
- Continued mistrust of and frustration with security actors (namely the police) and myriad security concerns, including the role of self-defense groups;
- Increased prevalence and addiction to a variety of narcotics and pharmaceuticals and their connection to rising criminality;
- Consolidation of conservative social and religious values in the north, their impact on education, and tension among Islamic sects and schools of thought; and
- The steady rise and fragmentation of Islamiyya and Almajiri schools and tension between calls for standardization of Islamic curriculum and widespread resistance to reforming Islamic schools.

A central finding from our desk and field research is the need to re-frame radicalization in our discourse, research, policies, and programs, including radio, in more inclusive and empowering ways. As some experts have said – and we agree – we must allow youth and communities to be radical in the fight against violent radicalization.²

Specifically, our radio (and broader CVE) programming proposes a shift from diagnosing and examining the problem (a deficit-based approach) to developing the tools, platform, and language to create a shared and inclusive vision (an asset-based or vision-oriented approach) that humanizes all actors and validates grievances on all sides. We believe this is a critical missing component of strategies that aim not only to counter extremism and build resilience, but also to rehabilitate and reintegrate both insurgents and others affected by the conflict. We look at the question: how might “radicalized” individuals contribute to social transformation in a non-

² Devex, “Allow youth to be radical in the fight against radicalization, experts say,” May 29, 2017, <https://www.devex.com/news/allow-youth-to-be-radical-in-the-fight-against-radicalization-experts-say-90340>

violent and constructive way? We suggest a conceptual shift away from approaches that only emphasize “de-radicalization” and “countering” violent extremism to approaches that “**re-frame radicalization**” to take into account human potential, unique leadership abilities, the potential predisposition of some “radicals” towards self-efficacy, agency, and empowerment, and the need to create alternative pathways in closed societies for frustrated individuals to engage in positive social change. We suggest, and our radio programs will explore further, that it is possible to re-orient radicalized individuals towards positive social goods, such as education, youth empowerment, human rights, peaceful coexistence, social justice, and other forms of civic empowerment. We believe that through inclusive, honest, and vision-oriented dialogues, northern Nigerians can work to create viable alternatives for at-risk and radicalized youth that strengthen agency and commitment to positive social change instead of destruction and division.

Barriers to re-orienting engagement with radicalization include narrow policies and closed societies that fail to create or protect the space for non-violent civil protest and community mobilization, leaving violent and destructive opposition movements as the preferred (or in some cases only) method to transform social systems that people do not benefit from or feel represented by.

These complex challenges are explored below and are further developed in our three radio programs over the course of 44 weekly episodes broadcast by 22 prominent radio stations across all 19 northern states. These programs incorporate CVE messaging and behavior change communication into interactive discussions with credible, locally trusted speakers on topics identified as among the most relevant to northern Nigerians. These findings and proposed themes for our radio programming were shared and validated during a full-day stakeholder workshop in Kano, Nigeria on March 21, 2017. The full readout from that workshop is available in the annex section.

II. CONTEXT

a. Conflict Overview

Despite military advances under President Muhammadu Buhari that degraded Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, the group continues to operate across the Lake Chad Basin region and poses a serious threat to regional stability. Notably, the group’s allure and resolve are fueled in part by popular frustration resulting from perceived military aggression (evidenced by the January airstrike that killed around 100 internally displaced persons in Borno state³) against rural communities that have previously been sympathetic to Boko Haram’s narrative, and are frustrated with the military’s lack of community engagement in remote northern communities on citizen security. Boko Haram has further honed their recruitment strategy by more effectively targeting excluded and often unemployed young women, men, girls and boys.

BH’s influence and ideology, as well as its ability to conduct clandestine terrorist activities on soft targets, persist. These include a number of bombings and attacks in Plateau, Kano, Kaduna,

³ Reuters, “At least 76 killed in air strike on Nigerian refugee camp: ICRC,” January 18, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1512KY>

Borno, and Yobe states, often in mosques, marketplaces, and other public gatherings, which have seen women and young girls increasingly used as suicide bombers. The group's propaganda machine continues as well; video messages have taken on a more professional quality, as the group's communications and social media outreach increasingly resemble those of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), to which it declared its allegiance in March 2015. In recent months, new reports show that BH is broadcasting messages over FM radio frequencies they claim as their own. BH's sworn allegiance to ISIS and strong propaganda campaign have lent credibility and power to their violent extremist (VE) narratives, which threaten to capture the emotions and aspirations of young northern Nigerians already disenfranchised by widespread corruption, a lack of opportunities, and victims of heavy-handed security operations.

As the Boko Haram insurgency enters its ninth year, there is a need for a new strategy that prioritizes youth civic engagement in transforming radicalization in northern Nigeria. As BH's leadership begins to fragment along ideological lines, there is a unique opportunity to use strategic communications to counter the group's violent narratives and discuss what people across the North want society to look like going forward, including creating space for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former fighters and others abducted during the conflict.

Whether they participate as members of Boko Haram, are at risk of radicalization, or represent vulnerable and neglected communities, young women and men can play a critical role in creating local solutions and opportunities for reframing this seemingly intractable conflict. These young people have too often been perceived through the lens of their risk, rather than their potential contribution to social change and peace, thus further marginalized and pushed into destructive life decisions. Gendered stereotypes exacerbate these dynamics, with young women and young men seen and treated differently, adding to the stigma these young people experience. An inclusive and humanizing strategy would strengthen trust and understanding between security actors and young people at risk of radicalization, and would empower young people to take positions of leadership on the side of peace.

b. Project Approach and Innovation

To counter BH's propaganda machine and support inclusive dialogues on persistent drivers of conflict, and empowering youth-focused programming, Equal Access (EA) has conducted field research as a baseline to inform an innovative new project. This approach provides quality and credible radio programming to address the factors that drive citizens to BH. As a result of this formative research, we are developing and implementing three Hausa-language radio programs, each with a different focus, to form a CVE Messaging Center. To complement radio programming, the Center will employ Content Advisory Groups (CAGs), community reporters (CRs), SMS/IVR feedback systems, and both social media and direct community engagement. This innovative, participatory media-for-CVE methodology will guide the Center's development, while leveraging three key strengths:

- **Local ownership.** The way to perpetuate a lasting and authentic response to VE narratives is to amplify the messages of local influencers who have credibility within their communities. EA will train CRs to gather these voices from across Northern Nigeria, while our dissemination plan will ensure their messages reach the broadest

possible audience segments, particularly marginalized poor communities, minority ethnicities, youth, and women.

- **Constant feedback iterates content.** EA’s signature “generative communication ecology” builds in opportunities for collaboration and feedback from audiences, experts, and others in the form of Stakeholder Workshops, CAGs, as well as social media and SMS/IVR interactions with and feedback from listeners.
- **Media as an entry point into dialogue.** Complementary multimedia platforms allow EA not just to disseminate information, but also to engage listeners on CVE themes through SMS/IVR and social media.

c. Project Framework and Activities

Through this approach, EA will achieve the following goal: ***Counter BH’s ideology and messaging with positive local narratives that reduce vulnerability to VE in Northern Nigeria***, supported by two objectives:

- 1) Citizens in northern Nigeria have access to high quality programs that espouse peace, tolerance, and respect for the rule of law.
- 2) Radio programs and complementary audience engagement platforms provide space for citizens to engage on target CVE themes.

d. Formative Research Objectives

In order to address the critical issues fueling sympathy, support, and recruitment to BH, we have conducted field research across northern Nigeria to understand the intersection of issues and their linkages to radicalization and patterns of violent extremism. While many social change interventions benefit from monitoring (keeping track of progress, what is happening right now) and evaluation (measuring results, looking back), not all interventions are informed by field research conducted prior to implementation. This formative research provides the opportunity to listen to those we intend to reach and empower with our communication programming, and to learn from those with which we hope to partner.

The goal of this research was ***to gather information and perspectives from the general public in different northern states on relevant issues, and opinions they have on different aspects of life in their communities***. We also took the opportunity to meet with selected radio stations to discuss operational details such as airtime rates and time slots appropriate for the airing of our radio programs. This report will greatly inform the thinking and content of our three radio programs: *Ina Mafita* (“The Way Forward”), *Ilimi Abin Nema* (“Pursuit of Knowledge”), and a radio drama titled *Labarin Aisha* (“Aisha’s Tale”), which all come under the umbrella of the *Farar Tattabara* (White Dove) radio platform. As of April 15, 2017, we have agreements to air our programs with 23 radio stations across 19 states in northern Nigeria (the airing schedule can be found in the Annex C).

The research was conducted by the Equal Access radio production team responsible for creating the content for our radio shows and supported by Equal Access’ Africa team, technical research team, and in-country Content Manager and Security Manager. As such, the 13-day research trip

helped to open each team member's eyes to the issues faced in each northern state and by a range of actors, organizations, religious, social, and youth groups. Through the 44 episodes of each program, *Farar Tattabara* will be tackling and exploring their perspectives directly with audience members in a way that builds consciousness and advances the discussion on CVE in northern Nigeria.

III. METHODOLOGY

In order to gather the most pertinent and recent information for this report and to inform the content of our upcoming radio program, we employed three primary methods of collecting information: formal interviews using a structured survey (samples can be found in Annex A); interactive focus group discussions informed by a structured survey; and desk research on relevant literature.

Equal Access conducted research missions from January 9-23, 2017 with two mixed-gender research teams composed of three Nigerian Equal Access radio program and production staff in each team. In total, the Equal Access research teams interviewed 353 people across northern Nigeria. Each interview lasted between 30-60 minutes. 54 people were interviewed in the Northeast region⁴ (Gombe and Bauchi), 207 people were interviewed in the Northcentral region (Abuja FCT, Plateau, Nasarawa), and 92 people were interviewed in the Northwest region (Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi). 79% of respondents were men and boys, with ages ranging from 14 to 65. Most respondents were between 15-45 years of age. Respondents included farmers, students, civil servants, day laborers, IDPs, and unemployed youth in both urban and rural areas.

a. Desk Review

To prepare our research team and provide background information on the changing CVE dynamics in Nigeria, the latest CVE theories of change, and to situate our field research within a social and behavior change communications framework, we conducted a desk review of recent and relevant literature. We briefly summarize key definitions and literature related to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). In the context of Equal Access' work in northern Nigeria, we are guided by the definition of CVE as found in the U.S. Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy:

*CVE refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence.*⁵

A more narrow and succinct definition was proposed by McCants and Watts of the Foreign Policy Research Institute: "Reducing the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means."⁶ The merit of this shorter definition, they argue, is that it does not include coercive forms of "countering" activity (arresting, killing), better left to law enforcement and

⁴ Note: Equal Access, in consultation with the Embassy, made the determination that security in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa was not conducive to our field research and therefore did not conduct research in these three states.

⁵ Department of State & USAID. May 2016. [Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism](#), p. 4.

⁶ McCants, William & Watts, Clinton. 2012. ["U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment."](#) Foreign Policy Research Institute.

militaries. Whether defined broadly or more narrowly, CVE has become a field of study that cuts across disciplines, inspiring academics and practitioners working in psychology, crime prevention, history, ethnic studies, communications (including mass media, social media and journalism), defense (military and civilian) and education/peace-building.

An in-depth discussion on the drivers of violent extremism commissioned by USAID stressed that structural “push factors” – underlying social, economic, and political conditions – are often less important than “pull factors,” the lure of rewards (respect, recognition, belonging, purpose, and status), environmental factors (porous borders, changing climate conditions, and under-governed spaces), and the resonance of certain leaders, rewards, or ideals.⁷ This view has been recently contested, however. Cameroonian historian Achille Mbembé describes BH as “a job like any other” for many young people in the region, with religion playing only a minor role. “Not very long ago youth could emigrate for work, to Libya to the Gulf states or to Europe,” but those opportunities have dried up, and joining an extremist group becomes a pragmatic choice – one that allows social mobility.⁸

While the situation in the Sahel evolves over time, different push and pull factors are cited, with added nuances and contextual factors added on an ongoing basis.⁹ Accounts of how and why people join violent extremist groups have ranged from the typological,¹⁰ to the technological,¹¹ and in relation to leaving violent groups, the highly personal.¹²

The United States counter-insurgency (COIN) manual summarizes the motivations for joining or supporting violent extremist groups that are found across CVE literature:

- Coercion;
- Persuasion;
- Reaction to abuses (grievances);
- Foreign support; and
- Apolitical motivations (which can include romantic notions of adventure and the attraction of lucrative criminal activity).¹³

These motivations are accompanied by the caveat that “a mixture of motivations may motivate any one individual,”¹⁴ which is akin to saying that there is no standard template, no guaranteed recipe, for making, nor for unmaking an extremist.

The coercion element is particularly relevant for the Lake Chad Basin as the primary violent extremist group operating in that region, BH, has been described as relying heavily upon force and coercion to swell their ranks and to carry out violent acts. A series of articles appearing in

⁷ Denoeux, Guilain & Carter, Lynn. (2009) “[Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming](#),” USAID, pp. 8-9.

⁸ Achille Mbembé : « [Faire la guerre est devenu un boulot comme un autre](#) », Jeune Afrique, May 7 2015.

⁹ Loada & Romaniuk, for example, have picked up the “push and pull drivers” framing and extend it considerably. Loada & Romaniuk. 2014. “[Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Toward National Resilience Amid Regional Insecurity](#),” Global Center on Cooperative Security, pp. 13-29.

¹⁰ Todd Helmus has led the way for nearly 10 years on this topic, comprehensively discussing groups, institutions and rewards (2009), as well as the internet and social media, as both a means of recruitment and a means to counter recruitment (2016). Why and How Some People Become Terrorists in Davis, Paul & Cragin, Kim (Eds). 2009. “Social Science for Counter Terrorism: Putting the Pieces Together.” RAND, pp. 71-111.

¹¹ Helmus, Todd C., et al., 2013. “[Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism](#).” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

¹² Horgan, John. 2009. Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements. Routledge.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army. 2006. “[Counterinsurgency](#).” p. 1-8.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the New York Times in 2016 highlighted the coercion phenomenon in relation to both recruitment and suicide bombing, with a focus on the manipulation and use of girls and women.¹⁵ This development will have implications for communication programming. Much like with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, as communication needs evolved from prevention-only in the early stages, to adherence to treatment as the epidemic continued, and then stigma reduction as treatments began having effect, the range of CVE-related issues to be addressed through radio and community dialogue will also need to evolve over time. The prevention and resilience-building focus may need to be broadened to incorporate issues of stigma, rehabilitation and management of fear of ex-combatants to ensure that responses to violent acts are nimble and are adapted as recruitment and violence evolve.

Below we summarize two recent and very thorough reviews done on CVE literature and evidence in 2015 and 2016. The first of which, by Peter Romaniuk, presents an evaluator's perspective, thoughtfully asking, and partially answering: "Does CVE work?"¹⁶ This review summarizes the bulk of the CVE literature, which includes communication and makes specific reference to research on media and community engagement activities in the Lake Chad region.¹⁷ The second, by Kate Ferguson,¹⁸ reviews evidence and literature on communication approaches to CVE, including mass media and social media. As stated by Romaniuk and colleagues in a 2013 publication, it is difficult to gauge the impact of preventive engagement, i.e., of 'measuring the negative,'¹⁹ because success is determined by a non-event, which in this case is the *absence* of violence or *not* joining an armed group.

Kate Ferguson joins other social scientists²⁰ in warning of stigmatization and alienation of Muslims – or specific ethnic groups – by associating only certain groups with CVE. The past few decades of violent extremism do leave us, however, with many helpful and hard-won lessons. The wealth of military and social science writing on the subject provide typologies, frameworks, a range of counter strategies, and to a much lesser degree, evidence of what has worked in the past.

The question of language may be another issue requiring careful attention for CVE program designers. Writing on behalf of the "Combatting Terrorism Center" at West Point, analyst Jacob Zenn and other regional experts have made a strong case for "the Kanuri connection," highlighting the ethnic Kanuri origins of many BH members and supporters.²¹ Radio programs like *Dandal Kura* broadcasting in the Kanuri language in northern Nigeria are a recent effort to

¹⁵ Searcey, Dionne. 2016. "Nigeria Vexed by Boko Haram's Use of Women as Suicide Bombers" February 11, online edition; Searcey, Dionne. 2016. "Boko Haram Turns Female Captives into Terrorists." April 7. Online edition.

¹⁶ Romaniuk, Peter. 2015. "[Does CVE Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism.](#)" Goshen, Indiana.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 30-32.

¹⁸ Ferguson, Kate. 2016. "[Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence.](#)" University of East Anglia, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research. p. 27. See also the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 3: "Any CVE program should avoid the identification of violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality, or race," p. 3.

¹⁹ Chowdhury-Fink, et al. 2013. "[Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming Practice and Progress.](#)" Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, p. 4.

²⁰ In relation to the Somali diaspora in Minnesota, see Weine, Stevan 2013. "Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism, Democracy & Security." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: 81-89.

²¹ Jacob Zenn. 2014. [Boko Haram: Recruitment, financing and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad Region](#), CTC Sentinel, October 14. A more nuanced perspective is put forth by the University of South Florida – see "[Governance, Religion & Civil Society: Boko Haram's Kanuri Connection?](#)" August 3, 2014.

speak directly to citizens including vulnerable youth in the Lake Chad region.²² *Dandal Kura* is careful not to paint the Kanuri population as *uniquely* vulnerable to BH recruitment efforts, focusing instead on developing through peacebuilding a “sense of belonging and ownership” among the estimated 9-million Kanuri speakers in the Lake Chad basin, who can access the program through short-wave radios.²³

Looking forward as well as back, scholars and practitioners in the field of crime prevention have been active contributors to CVE literature. Their work helps us transition from descriptions of the “what, who, and why” of CVE to the “now what,” with great efforts made to systematize and describe approaches to counter and contain violent extremism. In his book “Strategies for Preventing Terrorism,” Tore Bjørgo presents nine elements for a prevention model, three of which (underlined) can be supported through communication:

1. Establishing and maintaining normative barriers;
2. Reducing recruitment;
3. Deterrence (Threat of sanction);
4. Disruption (stopping acts before committed);
5. Protecting vulnerable targets (reducing opportunities for violence);
6. Reducing the harmful consequences;
7. Reducing the rewards;
8. Incapacitation (or neutralization); and
9. Desistance and rehabilitation.²⁴

Communication (including mass and social media) is usually referenced in CVE literature in relation to persuasion, the first motivation in the COIN list, and as an approach to building citizen’s resilience and resistance to violent extremist groups and their own persuasive appeals. For many, communication is equated (somewhat reductively) with the “counter-narrative” approach to CVE, which is seen as a means to inoculate against and/or debunk violent extremist messaging.²⁵ Alex P. Schmid, Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative, joins other CVE researchers in suggesting that more than communication is required to counter violent extremism: “Doing the right thing rather than saying the right thing produces, ideally, the stronger narrative, and in that sense the interaction patterns between host community and vulnerable youth constitute a non-verbal message that might better manage to prevent extremists gaining more ground in a community.”²⁶ Schmid is not asserting here that “counter-narratives” do not matter; rather, he recognizes that the appropriate use of communication happens in parallel with other on-the-ground community and government efforts. Communication serves to generate dialogue, increase knowledge and awareness, and invite community action. It can

²² Vanguard, [Local radio joins the fight against Boko Haram](#), April 13, 2016.

²³ J. Jaafar, [Canadian broadcaster sets up radio to fight Boko Haram insurgency](#), Premium Times, November 27, 2015.

²⁴ Bjørgo, Tore. 2013. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*. Palgrave Pivot.

²⁵ This approach is covered in detail by Ferguson, and also criticized as lacking an evidence base for claims made, see [“Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence,”](#) pp. 7-16.

²⁶ Schmid, Alex. 2014. [“Al-Qaeda’s ‘Single Narrative’ and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge,”](#) International Center for Counter Terrorism – The Hague, p.14. See also: Norton, Anastasia, et. al. 2015. [“A New Frame for CVE: Analyze Beliefs, but Counter Behavior.”](#) Brookings Institute Research Brief. Online edition.

support, complement, or counter-balance government and community action, but it cannot undo it, nor can it fully compensate for inaction.²⁷

Research related directly to the Lake Chad Basin can be mined for insights and built upon for future CVE programming. Mercy Corps' thorough research²⁸ highlighting the voices of former BH combatants and captives contains direct quotes that suggest opportunities for programming. For example, a young man from Borno, described as "chairman of a community youth group," reported that support from his youth group allowed him to resist several recruitment attempts by BH.²⁹ Another young man from Yobe described BH's attempt to use defense of Islam as a recruitment technique: "They told us that it is the role of youth to protect the religion of God."³⁰ These first-hand accounts suggest that it might be fruitful to design and test programming that fosters youth civic associations and that positions youth as agents of change, programming designed to invite their ideas and contributions rather than telling them what to do and think.

IV. KEY FINDINGS

Based on hundreds of interviews, we have identified several recurring themes that we believe represent some of the main challenges facing people, and youth in particular, across northern Nigeria. Below they are discussed and analyzed based on what our research team saw and heard. In many cases, we discuss the implications of these themes for our radio programming.

While field research was not conducted in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa due to security concerns, one of our researchers is from Borno and several others on the team have extensive experience working and conducting research in the Northeast. Therefore, we tried to reflect concerns and opinions of those communities based on prior knowledge, desk research, and previous field research.

a. Economic Crisis

"Everyone wants more to do, to work, but there is nothing and jobs are impossible to find."
-Male merchant in his 20s, Bauchi state

Central to almost every discussion was the current economic crisis and the impact of the currency devaluation on everyday lives, decision-making, and security. Respondents consistently reported that the economic crisis has led to growing insecurity in the form of petty theft, banditry, burglary, and, to a lesser extent, kidnapping. Government officials and private companies have often delayed or relocated development and investment projects away from the

²⁷ Some CVE experts would point to the influence of the Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism strain of Islam as being a threat better handled through policy and/or sanction rather than communication. See McCormak, David. 2005. "An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa." The Center for Security Policy, January, No. 4; and Solomon, Hussein. 2015. "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram." Palgrave Macmillan, locations 841 (re Saudi influence in Cameroon) and 2237-2270 (influence in Nigeria).

²⁸ Mercy Corps. 2016. "['Motivations and Empty Promises' Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth.](#)" Portland.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

North due to continued insecurity. This has had a tangible negative impact on both livelihoods and feelings of marginalization and regional deprivation.

When asked about potential solutions, young people seek technical and vocation training, access to loans, entrepreneurship coaching, and support to develop and launch small businesses. Due to heavy reliance on the government for civil service jobs and handouts, the economic downturn has created significant hardship for lower and middle class families. One caveat to this was found across the Northwest, where respondents report being more self-reliant. This appears to be a result of more entrepreneurial tendencies and a general lack of trust in the government.

Given the heavy reliance on farming in the North, many respondents commented on the gaps in the agriculture and subsistence farming sectors. Specifically, farmers in the Northcentral region report having inadequate farming tools and techniques, as well as a lack of storage facilities and access to larger markets for distribution. Also undermining livelihoods are ongoing clashes between herders and farmers. As one male farmer told us, “I want the government to bring an end to clashes between herders and farmers,” saying “let us create rules that govern both farmers and herders.”

b. Changing Insecurity

“People are very divided and honestly, it is slowing down our progress as a country.”

-Male civil servant, 32, Kaduna state

Insecurity remains a primary concern of citizens across the North, most notable in the Northeast. Despite claims of victory by the military, many residents continue to feel unsafe due to ongoing attacks by BH and heavy-handed security operations. In many ways, violence has been normalized in the Northeast given the protracted nature of the conflict and relative lack of mention of BH by respondents not immediately affected. In fact, when asked their primary security concerns, many respondents cited the economic crisis as the most serious driver of conflict.

While many respondents feel that the military is doing a better job at addressing the BH crisis, many also feel they have not responded well to the massive resulting humanitarian crisis, including the displacement of millions of people across Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region. This, some argued, could further alienate already vulnerable communities in previously BH-held territories to oppose the state. Despite the fluid security situation, perceptions of the military are steadily improving. Yet incidents like the recent accidental bombing of a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Borno state continue to raise questions about the military’s intelligence collection, professionalism, respect for human rights, and accountability.³¹ When it comes to the police, most respondents in North-central and Northwest Nigeria feel frustrated and lack trust in the Nigerian Police Force. Respondents feel that the police do not show presence in crime-ridden neighborhoods; they still ask for bribes, and are often implicated in criminal activities.

³¹ Reuters, “At least 76 killed in air strike on Nigerian refugee camp: ICRC,” January 18, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1512KY>

Radio programming could facilitate discussions with residents about security concerns and generate a constructive dialogue about how communities and security forces, namely the police, can better understand each other and work together to address safety and security issues.

Another important dynamic fueling social tension and affecting the safety of communities across the North is the widespread usage and presence of vigilantes and self-defense groups. While the Borno-based Civilian-JTF (Joint Task Force) is the most commonly known, these groups have proliferated across the Northeast and to other states in the North. These groups are a direct result of the lack of trusted and consistent presence of security forces in insecure areas.

Desk research from the past 3-4 years of scholarship tells us, and recent interviews confirm, that while the vigilantes have been helpful at identifying criminals and insurgents, they have also had the unfortunate side effect of rendering local communities more vulnerable to targeting by BH and other oppositional groups. As the CTJF emerged as a trusted partner of the military in their fight against BH, they became a legitimate target of BH militants who see them as in direct opposition to their cause and a threat to their operations. As a result, civilians saw attacks shift toward them and other vulnerable communities, IDP camps, crowded markets, and other soft targets whereas historically (before 2013) the group had focused its targeting more on corrupt and oppositional officials, religious leaders, and infrastructure (roads, bridges, media, and telecoms towers).

In Kaduna state, respondents highlighted that competition between tribes and religions creates insecurity because groups compete for power and influence. In Kebbi state, there is a mistrust of strangers because of insecurity and their perceived role in diluting local values and traditions. To prevent further conflict, one young man from the Northwest told us, “We need to raise awareness about the need for peaceful co-existence in the North. We can form associations to tackle identity differences and build understanding between different ethnic groups and sects.” Similar efforts can be incorporated into radio programming, discussing identity difference and the strengths of a multicultural society.

One security dynamic that respondents feel is becoming *less* of an issue is the impact of hundreds of thousands of IDPs on host communities in the Northeast. For example, communities previously reported clashes with IDPs in Bauchi, Gombe, and other states because of competition for limited resources, work, and tension between ethnic groups. Insecurity has been exacerbated by issues of economic decline and rising youth unemployment, which have seen a rise in crime and incidents of police and military aggression. Respondents felt that tension with IDPs is becoming less of a security concern because IDPs are starting to return to their communities of origin and because communities have become accustomed to their presence. Although less an issue than before, the topic of identity and the “*otherization*” of specific religious and ethnic sub-groups remains a critical topic for behavior change communications. Our radio programming will problematize these issues in order to build tolerance, curiosity, and respect across different identity groups.³²

³² “Problematization is a critical thinking and pedagogical dialogue or process and may be considered *demythicalisation*. Rather than taking the common knowledge (myth) of a situation for granted, problematization poses that knowledge as a problem, allowing new viewpoints, reflection, hope, and action to emerge. What differentiates problematization from other forms of criticism is its target, the context and details, rather than the pro or con of an argument. More importantly, this criticism does not take place within the original context or argument, but

c. Prevalence of Drugs and Crime

“Government should double its efforts to tackle crime and make our communities safer.”

-Young unemployed man, Katsina state

Directly linked to the security situation is the prevalence of drugs and crime. Many people we spoke with felt that the currency devaluation and economic shocks have led to a rise in crime in many northern states, including muggings, robbery, and break-ins. In Kebbi state, respondents reported that many people have been killed for their bicycles. Many respondents in Abuja and Nasarawa reported a rise in both petty crime and drug use, including marijuana, codeine, opioids, rubber glue, and some methamphetamines. Respondents drew a direct correlation between the prevalence of drugs and drug use and crime. People felt that the police do not intervene enough to stop crime or respond to reports of criminal activity, believing they are likely complicit or apathetic.

Some respondents made the distinction between drug users and dealers. For example, many wanted to see stricter penalties for drug traffickers, criminals, and petty dealers, but some called for rehabilitation and other health services for users and addicts. This is an important distinction that can be highlighted in our radio programs, helping to humanize addiction and encouraging people to look at drug use through a public health, not only a criminal justice, lens.

d. Gender Equality

“As a businesswoman, I have decided to employ all women. This way, men will see woman in positions of leadership and will respect us more.”

-Woman, 30s, Abuja FCT

Many people interviewed feel like gender equality is slowly improving with awareness-raising campaigns, more women in positions of leadership, and more inclusive discourse by political leaders. However, when we dug a bit deeper, we learned that domestic violence has been normalized in many regions and many women still feel undervalued and mistreated. As an example, we heard several stories where families reported sending their sons to school, leaving the girls at home, because of challenging financial times. This prioritizes men’s role in education and society, thus privileging their chances for success throughout their lives.

To combat female marginalization in the media and society, our radio programming will feature strong female role models and voices to encourage female inclusion and participation in all aspects of society, including security discussions. Women admit that they have significant influence on men both in their households and their communities but often struggle to convert this influence into a tangible public good or recognized position in their socially conservative

draws back from it, re-evaluates it, leading to action, which changes the situation. Rather than accepting the situation, one emerges from it, abandoning a focalized viewpoint.” Crotty, Michael J. (1998). *Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. SAGE Publications. [ISBN 0-7619-6106-2](#). Describing Freire (1976). p. 155-156. For our purposes, we are interested to empower radio as a platform to explore the impact of exclusive “otherizing” narratives and socially constructed identities on social discord and radicalization in northern Nigeria.

society. When women get together it has shown to have an impact on male behavior. To advance public discourse, our radio programs will address women’s empowerment, including discussions with influential community and religious leaders, and the need for men to examine their own contribution to gender inequality by openly discussing perceptions and standards of masculinity, equity, and access to opportunities.

To combat gender-based discrimination, one young male entrepreneur from Katsina state told us, “Let us put an end to gender-based violence and discrimination.” When asked about gender preferences of TV and radio show presenters, some reported having a preference for male presenters. However, in the Northcentral region, most said they had no preference. For example, one male university student in his 20s told us, “I like listening to both male and female presenters on the radio.”

Note on Challenges Identifying and Interviewing Female Respondents. It is important to note that our researchers did face challenges in finding and interviewing women, particularly in the Northwest region. In total, women made up only 21% of our respondents across the North, and were only 18% of our respondents in the Northwest. In Kebbi, Zamfara, and Sokoto states, our team found very few women on the streets. One middle-aged woman in Sokoto confirmed to us, “Women are not given opportunities to say their views, because they are hardly allowed outside, except in rare situations.” In Katsina state, few women were spotted walking on the street while many were found when we entered the market places. In some places, women would lose interest and cut the interview short because they did not feel comfortable commenting publicly on certain issues or understand their relevance. Further south in Kaduna, we observed the opposite, where men and women were seen mingling together in work environments, markets, and on the streets, and were more keen to engage us.

e. Religion and Education

“Yes, but only once in my three years here.” -14 year old Almajiri in Zamfara state (when asked if his parents or family visit him)

The education landscape in northern Nigeria is shifting due to what many reported was increased religiosity and a consolidation of conservative social values, an economic recession making fee-based education out of reach of many people, and the steady rise of free alternatives to public and private schooling through Islamiyya and Tsangaya schools.³³

Many if not most respondents report that tuition fees are too high for them and their families. When forced to choose who will receive an education, some families send the boy(s) to school and keep the girl(s) at home, revealing a need for programming and messaging reinforcing the need for girls education and equality.

³³ Among the various types of schools in northern Nigeria, our report and radio program focus on Tsangaya schools (Koranic Almajiri boarding schools where pedagogy is based on memorizing the Holy Koran) and Islamiyya schools (Islamic schools that are more standardized and combine elements of traditional Koranic curriculum with educational models inspired by Western and Arab models) and challenges they present relating to youth development, girls education, and religious extremism.

The rise of Islamiyya schools, while a positive for many low-income families, has highlighted the need for standardization of curriculum in religious schools and the tension between different religious sects, leaders, and schools of thought.

When asked if they would like new curriculum to be introduced into Islamiyya and Tsangaya school systems, adult participants responded differently from each other. One educated Ulama from Katsina state said, “Yes, because we want our children to be more educated in various subjects.” Whereas a respondent in Kebbi state said, “No, I want to maintain this subject as it is,” and a respondent in Sokoto state said, “No, it will confuse our children.”

When students were asked about their experience and satisfaction studying in an Islamiyya or Tsangaya school, their responses were varied, but concerning. Despite many positive aspects, such as becoming more self-reliant, disciplined, and pious, most students report that their families rarely, if ever, visit them. Many report not having enough food, sleeping on the floor, having to move from place to place, and being deprived of sleep because of strict reading and memorization requirements. As one man in Gombe state observed, “Children don’t learn when they are uncomfortable.”

While many students couldn’t speak openly to us, because older students and teachers were often present, many told us that they respect their teachers but want to learn other subjects and to become educated like other students.

The influence and impact of the teachers on students was cited as significant, ranging from positive to abusive. Lacking standard methodologies or teacher training, personal ideologies often take hold and are capable of creating sympathy for extreme and intolerant views. Across the north, Ulamas, religious teachers and scholars, and traditional leaders were consistently mentioned as the most credible and respected sources of information. Their ability to influence life and shape popular thinking is both an opportunity and obstacle for CVE programming, depending on their willingness to engage in inclusive dialogue around the challenges facing Nigeria and the role of faith in addressing them.

When asked how religious schooling systems prepare students for work and life after school, one teacher from Kebbi state said, “We only teach them Islamic knowledge. Nothing else.”

Respondents were asked how they would change or improve the existing religious educational systems. One teacher from Gombe state said, “I would like to bring them all under one umbrella.” An Islamiyya teacher from Bauchi told us, “Every Islamiyya school in Nigeria needs government support.”

Programming around regulating religious schools and building unity and cohesion between schools of thought and among religious communities could have a significant impact on peaceful coexistence and inclusion. Efforts such as those led by Dr. Usman Bugaje to standardize the curriculum of Islamiyya schools present opportunities to address religious and social grievances that have become intertwined with competition for social influence by religious leaders. These leaders have great influence on their followers and represent an important partner in our efforts to discredit violence and violent extremism through religious and moral arguments.

Several religious leaders and scholars we spoke with admitted that Almajiri schools, while increasingly common, present significant challenges given their rejection of any materials, including Hadith, Sunnah, and Ijtihad, which are not derived directly from the Holy Koran. As one former Almajiri student from the Northeast told us, “There are definitely mistakes in the Almajiri school system,” saying that other subjects, such as science, math, literature, and history are needed. However, these views were in the minority. Roughly 80% of respondents in every state, with the exception of Abuja FCT and Kaduna state, pushed back against the idea of reforming the Islamic education system or curriculum in Tsangaya and Islamiyya schools. These individuals largely felt that each school belongs to its own sect and should be allowed to teach based on their beliefs. The minority 20% felt that education reform would help incorporate valuable subjects and reduce radicalization, but they recognized that many of these subjects – science, math, history, literature – are perceived as “Western” by Tsangaya schools.

However, there will likely be great opposition to religious school reform in some states. For example, in Sokoto state, 95% of the respondents were opposed to changing the curriculum used by Islamiyya and Tsangaya schools. Only 5% felt that curriculum reform would help in reducing radicalization and also give the children a better life. Similarly, in Kebbi state, 97% of people interviewed opposed the idea of reforming the Islamiyya and Tsangaya schools. One reason we learned throughout our research is that many respondents view reform as code for incorporating “Western education and values,” believing this will dilute the religious background and moral upbringing of their children.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, some states viewed education reform as a positive. In Kaduna state, only 15% of the respondents opposed reforming the religious educational system in Islamiyya and Tsangaya Schools. 85% of people we spoke with encouraged it and felt it will give children more exposure and prepare them for a better life while reducing radicalization.

When asked why religious schools are becoming more common, (other than financial reasons), several respondents noted that growing religious intolerance has contributed to people wanting to learn about their faith traditions and has led parents to send their children to religious schools. Many said this is also motivated by the desire to defend their faith from extremists who, respondents feel, are commandeering their religion. They want to better understand the history of their faith tradition, its roots in Nigeria, and its true message of inclusion and peace. Our Islamic education-focused radio program will fill this gap and ensure that presenters and guests possess a certain degree of knowledge of Islamic doctrine and arguments. We observed that this is critically important to discourage devout followers from using violence to achieve their ends.

While there is continued tension between Christians and Muslims in Northcentral states (largely fueled from herder-farmer clashes), many people see increasing rifts between the Shi’a community and other sects and schools of thought as more concerning (again, likely because herder-farmer conflict has become normalized). Scholars and religious leaders compete with each other for influence. People want these conflicts to end, through dialogues between schools of thought and finding ways to bring unity and tolerance. Respondents in the Northwest feel that public discourse has become hijacked by certain religious leaders and, as one young merchant in Sokoto told us, urge people to “seek true Islamic knowledge in order to shine a light on where

we need to go as a people.” While many agree that more unity is needed, many are deeply committed to their sects and schools of thought.

f. Outdated Thinking about Radicalization

Lastly, as we look at how to generate constructive and inclusive content for radio listeners across the North, our research teaches us that there is a need to move away from mere diagnosis and discussion of the problem toward helping citizens create powerful, or empowered, visions for how they would like things to be, in every area of their lives. In other words, instead of focusing our research only on the drivers of conflict, the problem, we asked respondents about their solutions and ideas. As such, a core component of our radio programming will be to move the conversation from analyzing the problem to facilitating a forward-looking discussion that is rooted in possibility, where the discussants identify aspirations and realistic but ambitious frameworks for building the society they want to live in. Our research aimed to do the same.

We believe a critical first step is to reframe radicalism and reorient CVE efforts in Nigeria. First, given the stage of the conflict that we are currently in – characterized by fewer attacks, the return of displaced communities, and the eventual reintegration of ex-combatants – there is a need to focus on social cohesion and the rehabilitation of militants, while still reinforcing traditional CVE messages and counter-narratives to build resilience, discourage recruitment, diminish support for violent extremist groups, and create alternative pathways for radicalized individuals. To reframe radicalism, radio content and related discussions will humanize grievances, including those held by individuals we perceive to hold or support radical and extremist beliefs. No individual is all bad or all good. CVE scholars and practitioners need to continue to add nuance to our analysis and our characterization of the different actors in each CVE scenario. Violence must be condemned unequivocally by all leaders, especially religious and traditional figures, whereas other on-air guests can add nuance and help speak to the range of individuals, beliefs, and behaviors engaged in radical activity and begin to situate them on a broader radicalization spectrum. A one-size approach or message will not work with everyone. By humanizing the “other” – in this case, radicals and extremists – we are more likely to create space for them to re-join society.

Desk research and interviews help us understand that having radical ideas or impulses is not necessarily the problem. In fact, so-called radical or radicalized individuals have been instrumental in creating positive social transformation in history ranging from the US Civil Rights movement, the anti-Apartheid movement, and countless movements and protests across Africa that led to decolonization and the rise of multi-party democracies in the 20th century.

If we look objectively – suspending for a moment the means, desired end state, or violent ideology of violent extremists – certain individuals on this spectrum demonstrate normal to high levels of psychological and behavioral functioning, or what some development experts refer to as the “Five C’s.”³⁴ These include competence, confidence, connections, character, and

³⁴ NPR, “The Psychology Of Radicalization: How Terrorist Groups Attract Young Followers,” December 15, 2015, <http://www.npr.org/2015/12/15/459697926/the-psychology-of-radicalization-how-terrorist-groups-attract-young-followers>

compassion.³⁵ An obstacle to success is that our current approach to engaging radicalized individuals, youth in particular, has often invalidated both their frustration and their abilities to create change, motivated by outdated thinking that defines them as the problem. This further isolates them and pushes them towards alternative, oftentimes violent and destructive, means.³⁶ Research shows that there is no clear psychopathological profile of a radical individual; those who become terrorists and extremists have “normal” minds for the most part, meaning that effectively combatting extremism requires a close examination and engagement of their context, perceptions, and grievances.³⁷

Research and observation also show that many so-called radicals demonstrate unique leadership abilities, deeply held commitment and motivation, and a predisposition towards self-efficacy, agency, and empowerment.³⁸ Instead of simply focusing on de-radicalization or military defeat of these individuals, we will find benefits from balancing countering and preventing extremism work with presenting viable alternative opportunities or pathways for these individuals to be equally activated and empowered towards positive social change. How might these “radicalized” individuals potentially contribute to transformative second order change³⁹ in non-violent and constructive ways?

We suggest a conceptual shift away from approaches that emphasize “de-radicalization” and “countering” violent extremism to approaches that reframe radicalism to take into account human potential, unique leadership abilities, the potential predisposition of some “radicals” towards self-efficacy, agency, and empowerment, and the need to create alternative pathways in closed societies for frustrated individuals to engage in positive social change. In this approach, violence is to be rejected and radicalization is to be engaged by communities and practitioners, who create inclusive off-ramps that include possibilities to reorient radicalized youth in favor of, for example, education, peaceful coexistence, economic inclusion, youth empowerment, and social justice?

When societies make space for fervent protest, mobilization, and non-violent unrest, we create more options for disaffected and marginalized youth to engage constructively. In some small way, we believe this radio project can create such a space for open discussion, instead of continuing to “otherize” and demonize those with which we disagree. However, we will do this delicately, since many of these efforts have become suppressed by the state or co-opted by other groups intent on weaponizing grievances. Without assurances or confidence that non-violent civil unrest will be protected, some groups see violence and division as their best option for transforming a social system that does not represent or benefit them. One form of abuse, often discussed by interviewees, which deepens disbelief in the system, comes through rampant manipulation of young people by politicians that are intent on settling scores or creating unrest to

³⁵ USAID, Positive Youth Development Measurement Toolkit, December 2016, https://static.globalinnovationexchange.org/s3fs-public/asset/document/Toolkit_1-6on-line.pdf?QYgNU1urD6o0KBm5dpXlgxwOuxBVCoxG

³⁶ Science News, “New studies explore why ordinary people turn terrorist,” June 23, 2016, <https://www.sciencenews.org/article/new-studies-explore-why-ordinary-people-turn-terrorist>

³⁷ Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization. *European Journal of Criminology*. 5 (1), 99-123.

³⁸ University of Chicago, “Project to examine extremist organizations’ social and neurological influence,” December 9, 2015, Social and Neurological Construction of Martyrdom Project. <https://news.uchicago.edu/article/2015/12/09/project-examine-extremist-organizations-social-and-neurological-influence>

³⁹ Second order change refers to a strategy or solution that creates a new way of seeing things and is capable of transforming and reorganizing a system to a higher level of performance and social value.

advance their own agendas. The lack of trust in the state fuels the spawning of local security and self-defense groups. As such, there is a need to have a holistic discussion of human security and explain what roles everyone can play to increase social cohesion and security, not only security agencies.

Furthermore, the efficacy of de-radicalization efforts is largely unproven and, some argue, has more failures than successes.⁴⁰ Devout radicals and violent extremists rarely embrace a transition to vocational training, unskilled labor, moderate views, or reintegration into their previous lives. To rehabilitate radicals, we must expand our understanding of their qualities and what options will be successful not only to pacify them, but more importantly to channel their frustration and character traits into positive action. Our radio program will work to integrate this nuanced understanding of human potential and behavior change into discussions of extremism while also making efforts to identify and highlight positive examples of good governance and effective leadership and their impact on reducing grievances and radicalization.

In short, the people we interviewed want peace. In order to have peace that makes space for insurgents and captives to reintegrate, we have to create space in public discourse for forgiveness and social healing. Respondents feel that actors that represent drivers of conflict, including government and security officials, can support this process by more openly acknowledging their contributions to well-documented drivers of conflict. As long as core drivers persist, CVE efforts will be crucial, while not always yielding immediate measurable results. In order to avoid being received as naïve, foreign, and counter-productive, CVE efforts must work to validate grievances on all sides, including those held by insurgents. Then we will see the importance of all sides demonstrating a commitment to reform, not only from the side of the insurgents. While systemic drivers will take years to address and correct, communities also want symbolic change, including recognition of wrongdoing and accountability, to restore local confidence in the State and those that joined the insurgency. Without confidence and trust in a mutual peace process, the violent insurgency and counter-insurgency are likely to go on for years, with vulnerable civilians being the most affected.

V. IMPLICATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

Equal Access-Nigeria staff involved in the formative research and program pre-production have been supported by UK and US-based colleagues specializing in social and behavior change communication, life skills development, research methodology, and countering violent extremism. These findings have also been shared with over 50 stakeholders from across northern Nigeria during a daylong Stakeholder Workshop in March 2017 (see Annex). Together, we have begun to ingest and analyze these key findings, examine the implications for our radio shows, and generate strategies and content for incorporating them into our future programming under the *Farar Tattabara* (White Dove) radio platform.

⁴⁰ Koehler, Daniel, "Understanding De-radicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism," German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies, 2016 <http://girds.org/news/new-standard-work-on-deradicalization-published>

The above findings will be incorporated into our scripts, storylines, interviews, and will help inform our selection of critical themes that interact with various elements of violent extremism, including radicalization, belonging, identity, recruitment, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

Given the sensitive nature of most of these issues and their deep roots in religious and cultural traditions, we will introduce themes gradually through our radio discussions. We believe it is important to frame the conversations in an inclusive way, gradually moving from implicit to explicit framing as the audiences soften to new ideas that challenge their deeply held beliefs and behaviors, particularly around religion, education, and gender roles. To improve our chances of success, we will ensure we have credible, locally trusted speakers on the various topics. Where appropriate, we will incorporate religious arguments, such as in “*Ilimi Abin Nema*,” our radio program exploring Islam and education. This will help audiences soften and consider new ideas when addressing issues of women’s empowerment, religious tolerance, human rights, or violent extremism.

We will pay significant attention to how questions are framed and their potential for positive and negative emotional responses. For example, we discovered that many respondents were resistant to reform Islamic education curriculum because they interpret this as code for integrating Western values into their religious education. Many see this as an attempt to dilute the moral upbringing of their children. By featuring a range of respected and recognized religious leaders that are pro-reform, we hope to encourage acceptance and show that subjects such as history, math, science, and the arts are globally accepted, not simply Western. We feel this approach may help people soften their stance on reforming Islamic curriculum in schools. From our experience in Nigeria and elsewhere, people’s beliefs and values can be considered on a continuum – with those more entrenched or closed-minded, you can go softly, and with those who already believe in the importance of human (and women’s and youth) rights, you can try to galvanize those people to engage and empower others. In other words, our radio programs will take this into account and will have a multi-tiered set of communication content, which in turn provides something for all audiences.

Furthermore, given the tendency of many respondents to equate “reform” with “Westernizing” we recognize that USG-funded efforts, such as this radio project, carry potential risks including their perceived illegitimacy. Equal Access has faced similar legitimacy challenges to our USG-funded Hausa language television channel, AREWA24, and have learned the importance of working with local and traditional leaders to ensure our content and framing are appropriate, culturally-relevant, and locally-accepted. Similar efforts are being undertaken to ensure the success of our radio programming, including organizing listening and discussion groups, content advisory groups, engaging community reporters in each northern state, and through our high-level stakeholder workshop to share and validate the findings of this report.

From our field research, stakeholder workshop, and first round of listener groups in all 19 northern states, we have learned that there are many themes that listeners want prioritized in our radio programming. Specifically, northern residents feel that our three radio programs can facilitate discussions around security concerns by engaging both civilians and security personnel to better understand each other and work together to address safety and security issues. Respondents felt that identity differences are increasingly fueling conflict and would like to hear

discussions where different ethnic groups and sects can discuss difference, tolerance, and the strengths of a multicultural society.

Similarly, respondents want programs to build unity and cohesion among religious schools, sects, and communities. At the core is a widespread desire to better understand the history of their faith tradition, its roots in Nigeria, and its true message of inclusion and peace. A surge in religious observation and exploration is largely driven by what respondents feel is an attack on their faith and values. As a result, our education-focused radio program (*Ilim Abin Nema*) will be mindful of these issues and ensure that presenters and guests possess advanced knowledge of Islamic doctrine and arguments. Their messages will serve to educate northern Nigerians about their faith and build tolerance among competing schools of thought. These programs will also promote peaceful coexistence and discourage devout followers from using violence to achieve their ends.

Furthermore, future radio programming through Equal Access's *Farar Tattabara* (White Dove) platform will be rooted in social and behavior change communication (SBCC). SBCC has a long history of tackling global health issues and is particularly relevant at inspiring healthy behaviors that are grounded in a particular socio-ecological context.⁴¹ Specifically, our SBCC-informed radio programming seeks to understand why and how people behave as they do and examine the structural and social barriers to peaceful coexistence and youth empowerment. Through weekly themed episodes, our expert guests and radio hosts will identify ways that community members can organize and act to address real and perceived barriers to peace.⁴²

As an example, many respondents during our field research identified drug use as a growing problem in the North, and as directly related to rising criminality and violence. When further questioned, some respondents made the distinction between drug users and dealers during our field research, advocating for stricter penalties for drug traffickers, criminals, and petty dealers, while calling for rehabilitation and other health services for users and addicts. This is an important distinction that is being highlighted in our radio programs, helping to humanize addiction and encouraging people to look at drug use through a public health, not only a criminal justice, lens. We are therefore better able to address the unhealthy behavior without criminalizing it, and can examine existing social stigmas and barriers to understanding and treating addiction.

⁴¹ International Media Support (2016), Constraints and opportunities: what role for media development in countering violent extremism; and Radsch, C. (2016), Media Development and Countering Violent Extremism: An Uneasy Relationship, a Need for Dialogue, Center for International Media Assistance. http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CIMA-CVE-Paper_web-150ppi.pdf

⁴² Ferguson, Kate. 2016. "Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence." University of East Anglia, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research. p. 27. <http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/countering-violent-extremism-through-media-and-communication-strategies-a-review-of-the-evidence/> See also the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 3: "Any CVE program should avoid the identification of violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality, or race," p. 3.

VI. ANNEXES

a. *Farar Tattabara* Stakeholder Workshop

On March 21st, 2017 the *Farar Tattabara* network organized a stakeholder workshop at Tahir Guest Palace in Kano. The stakeholder workshop ran from 9:30AM to 4PM and was attended by fifty-five participants. The workshop was designed to disseminate and validate the draft findings of its formative research. The event also provided the opportunity to critically review the production of the first programs making up the three series produced under the *Farar Tattabara* project, namely: the series on religious education, *Ilimi Abin Nema* (Pursuit of Knowledge), a youth CVE series, *Ina Mafita* (The Way Forward), and a drama, *Labarin Aisha* (Aisha's Tale).

To facilitate discussion, Equal Access played short audio clips from each of our three radio programs for participants. Each clip was roughly three minutes in length. The clip featured from our *Ina Mafita* (The Way Forward) program came from our fourth episode, on radicalization. The clip featured a brief introduction, then an excerpt from the story of Ibrahim who became radicalized as a result of domestic violence experienced as a child. Also featured was an excerpt from the aired discussion between Maryam Yakaka, a child psychologist, and a northern youth that had experienced violence and radicalization.

The audio clip shared from the *Ilimi Abin Nema* (Pursuit of Knowledge) program was from episode four, which focused on the life of the Almajiri in his school. The clip featured part of the episode introduction with our host, Muhammad, the discussion with a prominent Islamic scholar, and then the Vox Pop (interviews with members of the public).

Lastly, the audio clip shared from our radio drama, *Aisha's Tale*, featured part of episode one, which was an introduction to the drama and several of its characters.

Opening

Opening the workshop, Equal Access Nigeria Country Director Sam Compton explained the purpose of the meeting, asked everyone to participate fully in the dialogue, and encouraged an open exchange of ideas and opinions on the content of the radio programs. The *Farar Tattabara* Executive Producer, Maryam Muhammad, gave an overview of the research undertaken and explained the conceptual framework of the three programs that make up the *Farar Tattabara* platform.

Expert Panel: Review of Formative Research

To help participants critically assess the value of the formative research, a social scientist from Bayero University outlined the significance of the findings and described the methodology used by the research team. He observed that while the research was not an academic undertaking it provides an assessment of the improvements needed to assist in countering violent extremism in northern states of Nigeria. He suggested that the number of individuals in the sample size was too small for the geographic area and population. He advised that in future a larger research group should be selected. He also believed the methodology used might not provide the type of

accurate indications required to evaluate attitudes and feelings. Therefore, there is need to expand the research to include a larger pool of individuals and a more robust method of collecting data. However, he was able to clearly see from the research that there was little mutual coexistence between security personal and people in the north.

The speaker pointed to a number of issues that should be taken into account if further research is to be conducted:

1. Traditional rulers could be included in field research as their opinions are influential among northern communities and can increase local acceptance of behavior changes efforts and related program activities.
2. Similarly, highly respected personalities could be better consulted during the planning stage of the research work as they can help form questions and identify key areas of contention.
3. The research could be extended to additional states, such as the Northeast.

The formative research was further reviewed by a senior lecturer in special needs education, with an academic research background based in northern Nigeria. The speaker centered his discussions on the need to incorporate marginalized and physically challenged individuals in the research. He presented five categories of individuals with special needs, whose perspectives could be considered in subsequent research.

1. Street children
2. Almajiri pupils
3. Ex-prisoners
4. Single and divorced mothers
5. Handicap children

He also linked his review to the national policy on education (NPE), which views children in the following categories: special needs, gifted and talented, and disadvantaged groups

His rationale behind incorporating these categorizes in future research would be to establish the educational level of those in our research groups and connect to useful research documents on related subjects. This would enable a more refined assessment of CVE, susceptibility to extremist influences, and provide researchers the opportunity to arrive at actionable conclusions regarding young people and children. Specifically, he suggested that effectively engaging Tsangaya schools could bring significant value to a widely misunderstood area. Specifically, our research could:

1. Build government sensitivity to Tsangaya teachers
2. Support training and mentoring for Tsangaya teachers
3. Identify and better categorize Tsangaya schools and their needs

The final expert in the introductory expert panel was a legal academic from ABU Zaria. He commended the *Farar Tattabara* team for carrying out the research, which he described as timely and important. He said the research is necessary and long overdue and has come at the right time because people are willing to receive it. The speaker said we have no idea what is going on in many religious schools and it is time to introduce rules and restrictions. According to him, the problem is not Islamic schools, as such, but the lack of research and information about them. He advocated for a system that works for our contemporary needs. His overall evaluation

was that the research was fundamental to knowing how to assist in the area of CVE in northern Nigerian and he wondered why the Government had not already undertaken such significant research.

Questions to the Expert Panel

One participant at the event wanted to know if the *Farar Tattabara* platform could find out more about attitudes and opinions of people who lack an interest in radio. He felt that this would open up a wider dialogue. Another participant wanted to know if *Farar Tattabara* had plans to establish its own radio station. The Country Director, Sam Compton, said there were no plans to open a new station but those in the room represented the network that Equal Access and *Farar Tattabara* wished to connect with and they would help build a professional working relationship with key broadcasters.

A participant from Sokoto pointed to a potential weakness of the formative research, which influenced the content of the programs. He felt that an important ingredient in Hausa society had been overlooked, and that was the role of tradition. In many ways he felt tradition was as important as religion and can be used as a factor to counter extremism. One speaker agreed but felt teachers should be in a position to change society and improve it. He stated that tradition might guide us on how to marry or run a farm, but we need more than tradition to address the complex challenges we face. This led to a broader discussion on Hausa tradition and the value of including senior community leaders in further projects of this nature.

One radio station Managing Director (MD) emphasized three main issues that lead people to extremism: unemployment, poverty, and ignorance. Along with the *Farar Tattabara* programming and the independent radio stations' reach, he emphasized the partnership could continue to address the problem of CVE. He believed the local elements designed in the productions have developed local interest in the shows.

One radio station managing director asked what caused Boko Haram. It is painful for us to think of the reasons, he said, but thought we should talk about those reasons on radio. In commending the radio programs he said we needed to confront the effects illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty are having on young people. The government has not done well at addressing these issues in northern Nigeria, so he recommended considering a separate program to cover these issues.

Panel Discussion, *Ilimi Abin Nema* (Pursuit of Knowledge radio series)

The panel discussion commenced with a short audio clip of the program. Muhammad Adam, the program producer then hosted a discussion with Professor Sada and Dr. Yau Dantata. Muhammad asked what is the connection between science and technology in Tsangaya and Islamiyah schooling systems. One speaker said that science and technology are provided in conventional schools and are vital subjects, while in the Islamiyah and Tsangaya systems they are not seen as important. "We want our children to know Islamic principles, and to have a comprehensive knowledge on being a well-rounded and good person," said one speaker and added, "There is a need to call on community leaders to agree to help improve the Islamiyah and Tsangaya systems." He called on government to lead the development and provide public funds to pay teachers and monitor their standards. "There needs to be a bridge between Koranic

knowledge and conventional education,” he said. “Children should not be locked into one system so all branches of knowledge and teaching should be brought together to find a unified approach.” Muhammad asked what is the difference between Islamiyah and Tsangaya and one speaker answered by saying in Islamiyah schools the general conduct of Islam is taught while Tsangaya teachers focus only on Koranic recitation.

One panelist responded to a question on whether there should be a connection between conventional education and the Tsangaya and Islamiyah schooling system. He said the Koranic school system focuses on teaching vowel identification, the recitation, and finally memorizing the Koran. But the speaker felt there is a wider need to consider education as a whole and connect all elements in a holistic manner. He urged the government to intervene in the Islamiyah and Tsangaya schooling system as a starting point as there is a need for reform of the curriculum and this should include consideration of teaching standards. Most important, he argued, is that teachers need training and refinement, as their conduct has raised concerns and has the potential of causing delinquency through neglect of children.

One panelist addressed a question that related to our finding that suggests eighty percent of the teachers said reform of the Islamiyah curriculum was not needed. He said this was selfish and the refusal to change is not acceptable. Government must create a new policy that reforms the system. He felt that there is a need to bring uniformity to the present system, as it is just too chaotic and unregulated.

Muhammad asked one of the panelists what he felt, as it appears there was wide scale resistance to any change. The panelist responded by saying that propagation of enlightenment and awareness through the use of traditional rulers, stakeholders, and radio programs like the ones we are discussing today should make a big difference. Influencers, educators, parents, teachers, and broadcasters should all be involved.

One panelist also felt that Tsangaya scholars should be involved in reforming their schooling system and introducing broader subjects to their curriculum. But there also needs to be a concerted effort to help re-orient their thinking towards an acceptance of alternative methodologies and subjects. This can be helped by government inviting them to attend workshops to build awareness of the problems linked to the present Tsangaya system. Once they have built awareness they can be change makers and contribute to a reform process. This process could be supported by building up the type of radio programs discussed at this workshop. Muhammad asked a panelist what he thought of the radio program. Did he feel people would keep listening to the show? The panelist said it hit the nail on the head. It brings people together to talk about a subject we all know is a problem but has not been publicly aired or discussed like this before. He wondered why the government had not started these types of broadcasts before, and why it took a foreign NGO to think about these things and get them started.

Participants’ comments

Participants were invited to discuss the research and related topics that were mentioned by panelists. Among the comments were those of one representative from a radio station in Kaduna, who suggested we invite Tsangaya teachers and other religious teachers onto the radio programs. A participant from Kano suggested Islamiyah teachers were not interested in change. The fact

they are not paid leads to all kinds of problems and they are struggling to get money from parents and children and less interested in reforms.

Another representative from Radio Kaduna shifted attention to Makarantun Zaure (a traditional Hausa schooling system) and the women's education system and felt it was an issue that should be covered in the radio program. A representative from Zamfara Radio highlighted the existence of female religious schools and how these could be included in program content. She also requested that in every episode of the program credible and prominent Islamic scholars from different states should be invited to show diversity of thinking. In addition, she suggested the production team visit some rural areas to interview teachers and parents on to the radio show. One participant stated that to improve religious education we needed to understand the role of government, the role of parents, the role of teachers, and the role of the community and NGOs in supporting educational reform and cultural acceptance. Without this information little progress could be made.

One panelist commented by saying that teachers needed to be guided. If schools were left alone with no oversight there would be no balance so government needs to be involved. He felt that there needed to be sanctions for bad practice. At present, Nigeria simply copies the practices of other countries without understanding the consequences, he said. The reason Nigeria has extremism, he claimed, is that teachers do what they like and some control, training, and supervision is needed.

A representative from Borno Radio and another participant from Sokoto both said that public attention should be redirected to upgrade the outdated system of Tsangaya schools, which damaged the pupils' ability to properly socialize and integrate into society. A representative from Unity Radio, Jos, said that Nigerian philanthropists and politicians should get engaged in the Tsangaya and Islamiyah schooling systems. Those with money and influence in society were watching idly as children were being damaged and neglected.

Panel Discussion, Ina Mafita (Youth CVE Radio Show)

Halima Ibrahim, Radio Producer of Ina Mafita, hosted the discussion with Maryam Yakaka, a psychologist and consultant on the youth show, Jamila Zubair, a youth activist, and Abubakar Muhammad, a youth worker. This segment dealt largely with youth radicalization. Maryam explained in detail the concept and impact of radicalism and described the psychology of radicalization and the factors in a young person's environment that can adversely influence their attitude to extremism and violence.

One panelist started the discussion saying that normally it originates from the home environment but good conduct and examples from parents can positively impact on children and influence them into the future. Another panelist stated that the issue is directly traceable to the influence of the family, since home is the first place beliefs and behaviors are developed. It is initially more important than school. The panelist added that a child's transformation is a response and attitude to the environment around them and can introduce issues of unfairness that leads to extremism.

Asked what are the factors that generate radicalism, one speaker said he could outline a series of factors responsible for radicalism: a sense of injustice, broken homes, hopeless unemployment,

living in an atmosphere of religious intolerance, poverty, tribalism, ignorance, in an environment where bribery and corruption is a daily issue, insurgence activities, and selfishness or lack of empathy.

Participants' Comments

There was a lively interaction with participants on the program format. While the majority of speakers commended the content and the way important messages were addressed in the program there was a general desire to see music included in the format. A number of participants also observed that the show needed to better address a specific audience. This meant that it could not hope to hold the attention of parents, young people or community leaders all at the same time as each group requires a different technique to maintain attention.

A representative from Nasarawa State Radio commended the content and the elements of the program but held a similar view with an independent international journalist that there needed to be at least one musical interlude.

The participant emphasized the need to increase content that addressed the orientation of characters. He wanted the producers to think of ideas to build ethics and values into the discussions. Several participants requested the phone in segment be extended as they were receiving a high level of calls to the show. A representative from Benue State Radio urged the producers to find ways for Islamic teachers to encourage students to listen to the program, as it would be a good device to get useful discussions in the school environment.

Panel Discussion, *Labarin Aisha* (Aisha's Tale, drama)

The panel on *Labarin Aisha* was hosted by radio producer Al Qawas Abubakar Auwal who spoke to Patrick-Jude Oteh, Artistic Director of Jos Repertory Theatre, and creator of the drama series. Patrick outlined how the series was devised and developed. He explained how the character of Aisha came about and why they decided to focus on a girl. He also explained the underlying themes developed for the drama.

Participants' Comments

The discussion began with a media consultant who suggested the producers draw from real life incidents to help give the story a more genuine ring to it. A representative from Radio Niger led several other participants in a discussion about the time slot for the drama. He wanted it to be in a prime time slot and those engaged in this topic agreed that it should be placed in a prime position in the schedules as it had received good feedback from listeners. This is the case, with all stations contracted to air the show on primetime slots, but some participants had listened to the repeats and were not aware of the earlier broadcasts. A participant questioned why only the Hausa language was used. He pointed out that other languages were spoken in northern Nigeria and it would be good to open it up to minority communities. Another participant made a general observation, pointing out that only the names of radio stations airing the *Farar Tattabara* programs were mentioned, but their frequencies also needed to be mentioned, so potential listeners could find programming on their radio dials.

Towards the end of this discussion period, Executive Producer Maryam Muhammad raised the question about what other possible topics could be incorporated into the series, or potential

follow up series. The issue of women's education was raised by one radio station and supported by several other participants.

Conclusion of event

Most of the participants commended the organizers for a job well done and asked for another workshop as a follow up. They also urged for more research to be conducted, especially in the remaining northern states that were not initially visited. Several participants asked if the stakeholder's event could be extended to two days. They recommended that more teachers and young people should be included in any further follow up event. The Country Director of Equal Access, Sam Compton, provided a summary of the day's event.

b. Surveys: Ulamas, Parents, Almajiri, Youth, Partner Radio Stations

SURVEY FOR ULAMAS

Part A: Biographical Information

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Sect
5. Educational background
6. Marital status
7. No of children if any
8. Occupation

Part B

1. Do you run an Islamiyya/Tsangaya school?
2. If yes, for how long?
3. Area of operation.
4. Approximate number of pupils
5. Age range and gender
6. Number of teachers and their qualifications

Part C

1. What do you know about school curriculum?
2. Would you like it to be introduced into the Islamiyya/Tsangaya school system?
3. If yes why, if No, why not?
4. Do the Islamiyya/Tsangaya schools prepare the pupils for any trade/ business?
5. If yes, how, if no, why not?
6. Are you satisfied with the running of the said schools?
7. Different sects, with different Islamiyya/Tsangaya schools, how does that affect the unity of general public?
8. Do your kids attend both western and Islamiyya or Tsangaya schools?
9. If yes, why, if no, why not?

Part D

1. Would you be interested in a radio program that supported learning in the Tsangaya school system?
2. What would make you want to listen to such a program? What would make you choose not to listen to such a program?
3. Would you be interested in listening as a group with other teachers / parents etc (*GF it crossed my mind that the listener group approach would suit this kind of program well if it was possible at all to create groups*)
4. What information would be most useful to you in such a radio program? What information would not be useful?

5. What format would be most interesting to you? (I.e. drama, interviews, chat show, call in...). What format would be least interesting to you?
6. What kind of voices / people would you be interested to hear from? What kind of voices / people would you not be interested to hear from?
7. If relevant, would you consider using elements of the radio program in your classes as part of your teaching? (*GF: this might not be relevant, I am not sure if you are hoping to include teaching support materials in the program or not...*)
8. What kind of positive changes might such a program bring?
9. Does any kind of similar program already exist?
10. Do you have access to the radio? Do you have access to a mobile phone?
11. What time of day would be most suitable to listen to such a radio program?

SURVEY FOR PARENTS

Part A: Biographical Information

1. Occupation
2. Number of children
3. Age range and gender
4. Do your children attend Islamiyya/Tsangaya school?
5. If yes, how many of them and for how long?
6. If no, why not?
7. Why did you choose to send your child/children to a Tsangaya school?
8. Do you visit your child/children in Tsangaya school? If yes how often, if no, why not?
9. Are you satisfied with the method of teaching in the said schools?
10. Giving the chance, how can you modify the Islamiyya/Tsangaya school system?

Part B

1. Would you be interested in a program that (*please add in here a brief description of what you hope the program would do for parents i.e. a program that supported Tsangaya's to modify their style of teaching / modifies the Tsangaya system etc*)
2. What would make you want to listen to such a program? What would make you choose not to listen to such a program?
3. Would you be interested in listening as a group with other parents?
4. What information would be most / least useful to you in such a radio program?
5. What format would be most interesting / least interesting to you? (I.e. drama, interviews, chat show, call in...)
6. What kind of voices / people would you be interested to hear from?

7. If relevant, would you consider letting your children hear elements of the radio program as part of their home learning?
8. What kind of positive changes would you hope / might such a program bring?
9. Does any kind of similar program already exist?
10. Do you have access to the radio? Do you have access to a mobile phone?
11. What time of day would be most suitable to listen to such a radio program?

SURVEY FOR ALMAJIRI

Part A: Biographical Information

1. Age
2. gender
3. Town/ village
4. Tribe
5. Are your parents alive?
6. Who brought you to the school?
7. For how long have you been in the school?
8. Level of education(juz'i)
9. Do your parents/ guardian visit you?
10. If yes, how often, if no, why not?
11. How do you feed yourself and number of times in a day?
12. How satisfied are you with the living condition in the school?
 - How satisfied are you with the teaching condition?
 - What is your future ambition?
 - Any other information?

Part B

1. Would you be interested in a program that (Please add in here a brief description of what you hope the program would do for student i.e. a program that supported Tsangaya's to modify their style of teaching / modifies the Tsangaya system etc)
2. What would make you want to listen to such a program? What would make you choose not to listen to such a program?
3. Would you be interested in listening as a group with other students?
4. What information would be most / least useful to you in such a radio program?
5. What format would be most interesting / least interesting to you? (I.e. drama, interviews, chat show, call in...)
6. What kind of voices / people would you be interested to hear from?
7. Do you think it would be useful to listen to this program in school with your teacher? Could this program be used to support how your teacher teaches?

8. What kind of positive changes would you hope / might such a program bring?
9. Does any kind of similar program already exist?
10. Do you have access to the radio? Do you have access to a mobile phone?
11. What time of day would be most suitable to listen to such a radio program?

SURVEY FOR YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE

Part A

1. Name
2. Address
3. Age
4. Gender
5. Hobbies
6. Educational Status
7. Occupation
8. Marital status

Part B

1. What are the problems facing your community?
2. How does the problem affect the youth?
3. How does it affect you personally?
4. What measures have you taken to tackle the problem as an individual?
5. Have your community members attempted to solve the problem? If yes, what was done? If no, why has nothing been done? If you don't know, why?

Part C

1. Do you listen to radio?
2. Which station(s)
3. What part of the day do you mostly listen to radio?
4. What kind of programs do you listen to, and why?
5. What kind of impact does the radio program(s) have on your life and the community?
6. What kind of program(s) would you like to hear more?
7. Do you have a job? If yes, what do you do? If no, how do you spend the day?

SURVEY FOR PARTNER RADIO STATIONS

The radio stations were chosen due to the following reasons:

- Area of coverage
- Listenership
- Popularity
- Accessibility in neighboring countries

Sample questions

1. Name of the station
2. State of operation

3. Years in operation
4. Estimated area of coverage
5. Primary language of broadcast
6. Secondary language(s) of broadcast
7. Estimated number of listenership
8. Station's prime time
9. Does the station conduct live /phone in programs?
10. Does the station accept sponsored programs?

c. List of Radio Stations and Broadcast Schedule For Farar Tattabara Radio Programs in Northern Nigeria

S/No	STATE	STATION	PROGRAM	DAY OF AIRING	TIME OF AIRING	REPEAT DAYS	REMARKS
1	Kano	Rahama Radio	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3. Ina Mafita	Fridays	7:00pm	Tuesdays	N/A
				Saturdays	2:00pm	Wednesday	N/A
				Sundays	10:00am	Thursdays	N/A
2	Kano	Freedom Radio	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays	11:00am 12:30pm	Tuesday	N/A
				Saturdays		Wednesdays	N/A
				Sundays	10:15am	Thursdays	N/A N/A
3	Kaduna	Frcn(Hausa)	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3. Ina Mafita	Fridays	10:00a	Tuesdays	10:00am
				Saturday	7:00pm 3:15pm	Wednesday Thursdays	10:00am 10:45am
				Sundays			
4	Kaduna	Liberty Radio	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha Ina Mafita	Fridays	5:00pm	Tuesdays	4:30am
				Saturdays	10:30am	Wednesdays Thursdays	2:30pm
				Sundays	10:05am		10:15pm
5	Abuja	Vision Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Mondays	3:00pm 3:00pm	Tuesdays	N/A
				Saturdays		Wednesdays Thursdays	N/A N/A
				Sundays	2:00pm		
6	Bauchi	Globe Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays	5:00pm	Tuesday	2:45pm
				Saturdays	11:30	Wednesdays	9:15pm
				Sundays	2:00m	Thursdays	10:30pm
7	Gombe	Progress Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays	4:30pm	Tuesdays	4:45pm
				Saturdays	10:30pm 10:30pm	Wednesdays Thursdays	1:30pm
				Sundays			1:15pm
8	Katsina	Vision Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays	5:15pm	Tuesdays	8:00am
				Saturdays	11:00a	Wednesday	4:00pm
				Sundays	12:30p	Thursday	5:30pm
9	Jigawa	Freedom Radio Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays	5:00pm	Tuesdays	9:30am
				Saturdays	9:00am	Wednesday	11:30
				Sundays	5:00pm	Thursdays	5:00pm
10	Plateau	Unity Fm	1.Ilimi Abin	Fridays	10:00a	Mondays	3:30pm

			Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Saturday Sundays	10:00a 10:00a	Wednesdays Thursdays	4:30pm 4:00pm
11	Sokoto	Vision Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	5:00p 1:00p 1:00p	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	12:30pm 1:00pm 1:45pm
12	Yobe	Radio Yobe	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	11:00a 10:30a 11:00	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	2:00pm 4:00pm 3:00pm
13	Nasarawa	Nbs Fm/Am	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	11:30 12:00pm 12:00pm	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	11:00am 11:00am 11:00am
14	Adamawa	Gotel Radio	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	8:30am 11:00am 8:00pm	Tuesdays Wednesday Thursdays	2:00pm 7:00am 2:00pm
15	Taraba	Radio Taraba	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	11:00am 10:30am 11:00	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	9:00pm 9:00pm 9:00pm
16	Kwara	Radio Kwara	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	4:30 1:30 5:00pm	Tuesday Wednesday Thursday	4:30 1:30 11:15
17	Borno	Borno Radio	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	8:30am 10:00am 11:00am	Tuesday Wednesday Thursdays	9:00pm 7:30pm 1:00pm
18	Niger	Radio Niger	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Wed Sundays	11:00a 11:30 9:15	Sundays Mondays Wednesdays	8:30am 8:45am 2:30pm
19	Zamfara	Radio Zamfara	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sundays	7:00pm 7:30am 12:00pm	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	5:30pm 5:00pm 5:00pm
20	Kogi	Grace Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema	Fridays	5:00pm	Tuesdays	N/A

			2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Saturday Sunday	10:30pm 10:30am	Wednesdays Thursdays	N/A N/A
21	Kebbi	Radio Kebbi	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sunday	8:00pm 11:00am 9:15pm	Tuesday Wednesday Thursday	8:30pm 2:00pm 8:00am
22	Benue	Ashiwaves Fm	1.Ilimi Abin Nema 2.Labarin Aisha 3.Ina Mafita	Fridays Saturday Sunday	8:00pm 10:00am 10:00am	Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays	

d. Field Research Photos



Interview with an Islamiyya teacher in Kaduna state



Interview with young men addicted to drugs in Sokoto state



Focus group discussion with Almajiri (students) in a Tsangaya school in Bauchi state



Interview with an unemployed youth in Gombe state